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Beyond Trade
by Leonardo Gamier
President George Bush’s Enterprise for the Ameri­cas Initiative offers two potential gains to the countries of Latin Amer­ica: increased resources 
to finance national investment and 
widened access to the North Ameri­
can market. From these stand­
points, the initiative could be a 
step forward for the economies 
south of the Rio Grande. Yet only 
by learning from the mistakes of 
the past can Latin America prevent 
this potential opportunity from be­
coming merely a new phase in the 
old process of impoverishing 
growth.
Growth with Development
When it comes to examining the 
recent past, the neoliberal critique 
of Latin American desarrollismo 
scores some points. Thus, overval­
ued currencies, subsidized interest 
rates, excessive protectionism, grow­
ing fiscal deficits, and irresponsible 
monetary policies are not the kind 
of features that lead to economic 
development. Nor, I must add, do 
the profit margins earned by oli­
gopolies.
Central America and its Latin 
American neighbors must also
Leonardo Gamier is a professor in the 
Maestna en Politico Economica para 
Centroamerica y el Caribe at the Uni- 
versidad Nacional de Costa Rica, and 
a member of the research and policy 
institute, Altemativas deDesarrollo. 
His recent publications include “Costa 
Rica: el proceso de desarrollo y la con­
formation del sistema de transportes 
(1986-1989) * (San Jose: Centro de In- 
vestigaciones Sociales, Ambientales y 
Tecnologicas, October 1990).
learn from the distant past. The 
key lesson from those dimly recol­
lected years is this: not all forms of 
integration with the world econ­
omy permit the combination of 
local economic growth with social 
development. In light of current 
regional conditions, it is naive to 
assume that commercial and finan­
cial liberalization and the quest for 
macroeconomic balances by them­
selves will foster not only the re­
sumption of economic prosperity,
The key lesson is that 
not all forms of 
integration with the 
world economy permit 
both local growth and 
social development.
but also the development of the 
economic, political, and social in­
frastructure so vital to the region’s 
future. In Central America and sim­
ilar economic zones in Latin Amer­
ica, the fundamental obstacles of 
extreme poverty, weak production 
capacity, fragile political institu­
tions, and scarce financial and en­
trepreneurial resources are deeply 
entrenched. Unless these obstacles 
are addressed, export-oriented 
policies and the liberalization of 
economic life will lead to impover­
ishing growth—much as they did a 
century ago.
Concern for these obstacles has 
been conspicuously absent from
most of the structural adjustment 
programs implemented so far in 
Central America and the rest of 
Latin America. The Bush initiative 
and the bulk of the trade-bloc pro­
posal in circulation are no excep­
tions. To be sure, such ideas are 
promising in terms of widening ac­
cess to leading markets. But in 
spite of some attention to the fi­
nancing of national investment, 
the financial measures considered 
tend not to transcend a narrow 
range of export production and to 
be conditioned on the weakening 
or dismantling of essential state 
supports. Hence, without serious 
modification, the implementation 
of the Bush initiative and related 
plans would fail to address—and, 
indeed, could exacerbate—the 
structural limitations of the hemi­
sphere’s less-developed countries.
Once again, producers through­
out Latin America would be com­
peting among themselves to sell 
their products at increasingly lower 
prices on the North American mar­
ket. And once again, such competi­
tion would not revolve around the 
process of enhancing the value of 
local productive resources through 
the incorporation of advanced 
knowledge, technology, skills, or 
efficiency. On the contrary, it 
would be based on the cheapening 
of production through the widen­
ing use of low-wage, unskilled labor 
and the depletion of the region’s 
natural resources. Not only would 
this pattern continue to depress 
Latin America’s standards of living. 
It also would fail to reduce its vul­
nerability to technological ad­
vances and changes in trade policy 
in the US and other developed 
countries, which historically have 
eroded or undercut the region’s 
export markets.
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Heightened Competition EXPORTS, 1981-89
Within this framework, the Bush 
plan could present Central Amer­
ica with a particular problem. By 
generalizing many of the advan­
tages of the Caribbean Basin Ini­
tiative (CBI) to Latin America in 
general, the plan could jeopardize 
the area’s export opportunities. 
This is precisely the case with the 
advantages offered to countries 
like Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia, 
which are of special interest to the 
US because of their role in the 
drug war; it is also the case with a 
US-Canada-Mexico free-trade agree­
ment. So far, Costa Rica is the only 
Central American country to have 
taken advantage of the CBI in any 
significant way. In 1984-89 its non- 
traditional exports increased their 
portion of Costa Rica’s total ex­
ports from 15% to 40%; in 1989 
such exports accounted for only 
12 % to 20% of total exports from 
the region’s other countries. If not 
properly negotiated, trade policies 
based on the Bush plan could close 
the CBI door in the face of Central 
America.
Insofar as it offers widened ac­
cess to mjyor international mar­
kets, Bush’s Enterprise for the 
Americas Initiative is promising 
indeed. Nonetheless, for the long- 
range health of Latin America and 
the entire hemisphere, the Bush 
plan does not go far enough. What 
is also necessary is serious interna­
tional commitment—by the US 
government, multilateral agencies, 
and Latin American governments 
themselves—to strengthen the re­
gion’s economic, social, and politi­
cal infrastructure. Doing so is the 
only way to promote growth with 
equity and democracy throughout 
the Americas. ■
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Commentary
The US and Cuba
by Anthony P. Maingot
T o the extent that rational­ity is judgment based on a norm rather than any ab­solute standard of behav­ior, then one is tempted to call US-Cuban rela­
tions irrational. Certainly they ap­
pear to run against the norms of 
contemporary world practices and 
pronouncements about pragma­
tism and utilitarianism in interna­
tional relations. Since the US is far 
more prominent in its power and 
foreign policy, the tendency is to 
start by analyzing its contradictory 
behavior. Compared to US treat­
ment of other international “of­
fenders,” there is no doubt that its 
policy toward Cuba appears contra­
dictory and out of character.
Listen to George Bush defend 
the granting of most-favored na­
tion trading status to China: “Some 
argue that a nation as moral and 
just as ours should not taint itself 
by dealing with nations less moral, 
less just. But this counsel offers up 
self-righteousness draped in a false 
morality. You do not reform the 
world by ignoring it.” In other 
words, contacts and trade, not isola­
tion and embargoes, are the ways 
to bring about the changes you de­
sire. This is in the best tradition of 
realism in US foreign policy. It ech­
oes George F. Kennan saying that 
“the practice of government, after 
all, is a practical exercise and not a 
moral one,” and Dean Acheson re­
minding us that “the vocabulary of 
morals and ethics is inadequate to 
discuss or test foreign policies of 
states.” It is George Ball urging 
statesmen to avoid “moralistic
Anthony P. Maingot is editor of 
Hemisphere.
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mush.” Of course, while there 
have been idealists in US history 
(such as Woodrow Wilson and 
Jimmy Carter), Bush is very much 
in the mold of mainstream US for­
eign policy tradition. This explains 
why the US deals with China and 
Syria, and dealt previously with 
Panama’s Manuel Antonio Noriega 
and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. Again, 
in Bush’s own words, a successful 
foreign policy means charting a 
“moral course through a world of 
lesser evils.”
Since the Cuban 
revolution, the issue 
has been one of 
clashing US-Cuban 
interests, not lack of 
communication. 
Comparisons with 
US-Chinese relations 
are revealing.
The Absence of Pragmatism
So why all the apparent moralizing 
about Cuba? Is it that, of all the 
countries less moral than the US, 
only Cuba has crossed the line 
from “lesser evil” to “absolute evil”?
The answer is that the moralizing is 
only apparent. Separated from its 
rhetoric, Bush’s policy towards 
Cuba can be explained in terms of 
some fundamental realities of con­
temporary diplomacy and interna­
tional relations. Some comparisons 
with China are revealing.
First, there is the personal di­
mension. Bush, who headed the 
US mission in Beijing for two years, 
believes he knows what makes 
China tick. A similar personal at­
titude is said to govern his relations 
with Mexico. There is no evidence 
of any such personal sentiments to­
wards Cuba. Bush is the eighth con­
secutive US president to have sour 
relations with Fidel Castro; secret 
and not-so-secret missions have 
been sent to Cuba by every one of 
these presidents, including Ronald 
Reagan, who sent General Vernon 
Walters to talk to Castro. The issue 
has always been one of clashing in­
terests, not lack of communication. 
While nothing in Bush’s experi­
ence with Castro disposes him to 
take any initiative in breaking a 32- 
year-old freeze, nothing in his for­
eign policy realm compels him in 
that direction either.
Bush is not unrealistic in believ­
ing that the 1,200 US companies 
with $4.2 billion invested in China 
and the $10.4-billion trade surplus 
China has with the US provide him 
with diplomatic leverage. With a 
free-enterprise culture quickly de­
veloping in South China and with 
Hong Kong already established as 
the Chinese economy’s new finan­
cial center of gravity, Bush legiti­
mately sees a slow but sure pace of 
change in China.
No such factors are evident in 
Cuba. Additionally, US pragmatism 
towards China is not an isolated 
case. The European Community,
Japan, the USSR, and even Taiwan 
are dealing with China. The exact 
opposite operates with Cuba. Even 
its former allies in Eastern Europe 
will trade only in terms of hard cur­
rency on the barrel-head, and 
those who invest in jo int ventures 
in the Cuban tourist industry (i.e. 
Spain) are doing so in terms outra­
geously advantageous to them­
selves.
Trade is not the only arena 
where Cuba finds herself isolated. 
Former allies who owe Cuban inter­
nationalism more than just a debt 
of gratitude have quickly forgotten 
Cuba’s expenditure of blood and 
capital on their behalf. The most 
blatant case is that of Angola’s rul­
ing MPLA, which, in signing a 
peace treaty with archenemy 
UNITA, did not even invite the 
Cubans to the party in Lisbon. In a 
world where even Angola’s ardor 
has faded, it is not surprising that, 
when it comes to Cuba, there is so 
litde international pressure on 
Bush to go the extra mile.
Finally, and critically, there is a 
fairly wide perception in Washing­
ton—and increasingly in Europe 
and Latin America—that Cuban 
politics and economics have deteri­
orated to the stage where there is 
little space for diplomacy and bar­
gaining. Pragmatism’s operational 
code is that nations utilize what­
ever leverage they can to achieve 
goals. Castro’s own policy of the 
“zero option” appears to have re­
moved, or at least to have kept well- 
concealed, whatever cards he has 
to play. Today, as for much of the 
past 32 years, the game appears 
more like solitaire than poker.
Cuban Stagnation
This dismal scenario is evident in 
the discourse in Havana and, as 
such, is doing nothing to mitigate 
hard-line attitudes in Washington. 
The reason is less Castro’s opposi­
tion to glasnost and perestroika than 
his failure to show flexibility con­
cerning blatant realities in Cuba it­
self. If a leader will not admit to 
evident failures at home—the way
the Chinese leadership has with 
their economy—why expect such 
admission in international rela­
tions?
A wide perception in 
Washington—and 
increasingly in 
Europe and Latin 
America—is that 
Cuban politics and 
economics have 
deteriorated to the 
stage where there is 
little space for 
diplomacy and 
bargaining.
A recent summary of a four-day 
retreat of some Cuban leaders dis­
cussed their answers to 423 ques­
tions (Granma, May 26,1991). Two 
questions in particular—neither 
related to foreign policy per se— 
seem indicative of Cuba’s ideologi­
cal and decisionmaking stagnation. 
First, why hasn’t agriculture re­
sponded to the needs of the popu­
lation? The leaders responded with 
a cliche; their explanation was that 
international “objective” and “con- 
junctural” factors combined with 
the lingering “negligencies and 
bad habits” of the working class to 
produce this disappointment. A 
more flexible and pragmatic elite 
would have gotten more realistic 
answers from listening to another 
question regarding the low level of 
productivity: why are these prob­
lems miraculously solved when the 
same worker offers his services pri­
vately on the black market? Predict­
ably the leaders gave no answer.
Rather than attempting to find 
clues to US-Cuban relations in ei­
ther irrationality or inconsistencies 
in the US stance, it might be more 
productive to view both sides as re­
sponding to 50 years of a very spe­
cial (tutelary or imperialist, if you 
wish) relationship, followed by 32 
years of revolution and hostility. 
The resulting set of relations and 
attitudes is sui generis.
What, then, is called for? First, it 
would seem, is to understand that 
nothing nationally, internationally, 
or within Cuba compels the US to 
cast its relationship with Cuba 
within a broader framework of 
pragmatism. Second, everything, 
nationally and internationally, com­
pels Cuba to do just that. We may 
not know why Castro does not act 
more pragmatically, but there is no 
doubt that his failure to do so is 
the key to the current stalemate in 
US-Cuban relations. ■
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R E P
Free Trade and t he Caribbean
by Winston H. Griffith
C
aribbean industries such 
as garments, electronics, 
and data-processing— 
which the region’s gov­
ernments regard as cru­
cial to its economic 
development—are the most likely 
losers in the creation of a North 
American trade bloc. Such indus­
tries are essentially labor-intensive 
assembly operations. They are 
dominated by US firms that have 
located plants in the Caribbean to 
avail themselves of its inexpensive 
labor force in order to enhance 
their international competitive­
ness. With the formation of a 
North American trade bloc, how­
ever, and the consequent removal 
of tariffs on Mexican products, 
many multinational assembly opera­
tions will relocate to Mexico, where 
labor is even less expensive than in 
most of the Caribbean.
The Balance Sheet
Wage rates in the Dominican Re­
public, Haiti, and a few eastern 
Caribbean islands may well be com­
petitive with the wage rate of Mex­
ico. Nevertheless, the economic 
infrastructure of these Caribbean 
countries is much inferior to Mex­
ico’s, whose transportation and 
communication systems are well 
integrated with those of the US. 
What is more, Mexico is closer to 
the US than any Caribbean coun­
try, a particular advantage for head 
offices that prefer to closely moni-
Winston H. Griffith is associate pro­
fessor of economics at Bucknell Univer­
sity. His recent publications include 
“CARICOM Countries and Appropri­
ate Technology, ” World Develop­
ment (June 1990).
tor production. In addition, the US 
government may encourage its 
country’s firms that seek inexpen­
sive, unskilled labor to locate in 
Mexico, based on the argument 
that doing so will help to reduce 
the flow of illegal Mexican migra­
tion to the US while boosting Mex­
ican demand for US exports.
Mexico will 
out-compete the 
Caribbean not only for 
unskilled assembly 
jobs, but also for 
high-tech skilled jobs.
Though Caribbean countries 
will probably lose manufacturing in­
vestment to Mexico, some observ­
ers predict that the region will 
capture a significant amount of 
offshore data-processing activities. 
The reason, they say, is that Span- 
ish-speaking Mexico cannot com­
pete in this sphere with the 
English-speaking Caribbean. Ar­
guably, however, this assertion ex­
aggerates Mexico’s disadvantages. 
Rising demand for English-lan­
guage fluency in Mexico—which 
will occur with the formation of a 
North American trade zone—will 
likely lead to an increased supply 
of English-speaking Mexicans.
Not only will Mexico attract as­
sembly operations and unskilled 
jobs, but based on its relative advan­
tages in economic infrastructure, it 
will attract high-technology opera­
tions and skilled jobs as well. Ac­
cording to Kay R. Witmore, chair 
of Eastman Kodak, Mexico’s infra­
structure is “more or less up to 
Western-world economic capabili­
ties” (Financier,; September 1990). 
He adds that, when Eastman Ko­
dak decided to establish a plant in 
Mexico, it hired Mexicans to build 
the factory, and that Mexican busi­
ness managers are fully competitive 
with their US counterparts. Further­
more, Mexico’s pool of high-tech­
nology labor for such enterprises is 
much larger, as well as less expen­
sive, than the Caribbean’s. While 
Caribbean islands tend to have well- 
educated work forces, they cannot 
compete with Mexico’s in the 
realm of large-scale, high-technol­
ogy management and production.
Caribbean Strategy
Caribbean governments assert that 
the flow of direct foreign invest­
ment into their manufacturing sec­
tors is vital to the economic growth 
and development of their coun­
tries. Insofar as their competitive 
edge in the world economy is 
based on low wages, however, the 
gap is widening between the devel­
opment of local economic infra­
structure and the needs of foreign 
manufacturing investors. Govern­
ments such as those of Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago have intro­
duced policies to reduce the rate of 
wage growth and thus enhance 
their attractiveness to such invest­
ors. Even if these policies do prove 
successful in the short run, the 
long-run problem is that low-wage, 
low-productivity countries cannot 
compete with high-wage, high- 
productivity countries.
The reason for this problem is 
that high productivity—based on 
advanced technology and skilled
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labor—offsets the disadvantage of 
high wages by reducing per unit 
labor costs. Thus, although wages 
are several times lower in the Carib­
bean than in the US, the latter’s 
manufactured products tend to be 
more price competitive. Given 
Mexico’s advantages over the 
Caribbean in advanced industry— 
including skilled labor in greater 
numbers and at lower cost—a 
North American trade bloc would 
lead US firms to transfer many of 
their high-technology operations 
not to the Caribbean but to Mex­
ico. East Asian firms might also by­
pass the Caribbean to establish 
operations in Mexico, as a point of 
entry into the US and Canadian 
markets.
The Caribbean would be left, 
therefore, to compete with Mexico 
and the rest of the Third World for 
low-technology, low-skill activities 
by continually reducing wages and 
increasing other costly incentives 
to foreign investors. There lurks 
another competitor as well: tech­
nological innovation in developed 
countries, which threatens to dis­
place low-wage export manufactur­
ing in the Third World.
What are the implications for 
Caribbean agriculture? Though 
agriculture has fallen in absolute 
and relative importance to the 
Caribbean economy as a whole, it 
continues to generate substantial 
employment and foreign ex­
change. In view of the decline of 
the region’s traditional mainstays, 
sugar and bananas, Caribbean gov­
ernments have been trying to diver­
sify their agricultural exports. They 
have done so by taking advantage 
of the Caribbean Basin Initiative to 
supply the US market with nontra- 
ditional fruits and vegetables, par­
ticularly during the winter.
The Caribbean, however, is al­
ready losing in its competition with 
Central and South American agri­
culture, and unless a North Ameri­
can free-trade accord excludes 
agricultural products, the Carib­
bean will also be pitted against 
Mexico. Moreover, if there are no 
restrictions on agricultural trade, 
some California farmers may find it 
worthwhile to transfer their opera­
tions to Mexico when they come to 
face water restrictions at home. In 
any case, the US may be more in­
clined to buy from Mexico than 
from the Caribbean, given that US 
purchases will strengthen the Mexi­
can economy, increase its demand 
for US products, and possibly help 
to reduce the flow of illegal Mexi­
can immigration.
Unlike manufacturing and agri­
culture, tourism in Caribbean coun­
tries such as Antigua, the Bahamas, 
Barbados, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, 
and the Virgin Islands will probably 
be unaffected by a North American 
free-trade area. In Caribbean coun­
tries where tourism is a major eco­
nomic contributor, governments 
need to ensure that tourism re­
mains internationally competitive.
In addition, they should do what­
ever possible to maximize linkages 
between tourism and the econ­
omy’s other sectors.
Entrepreneurial Alternatives
If a North American free-trade 
agreement reduces the flow of for­
eign manufacturing investment 
into much of the Caribbean, the 
region’s chronic unemployment 
will be aggravated. Resolving the 
unemployment problem through 
conventional macroeconomic tools 
may be beyond the ability of Carib­
bean governments. Since the un­
employed must strive to attain the 
most basic necessities, we can ex­
pect that they will create their own 
employment opportunities. What 
activities they will engage in, how­
ever, cannot be said for sure. In 
any case, some of this self-gener­
ated activity can help lay the 
foundation for a broadened and 
reinvigorated entrepreneurial class.
As such a class emerges, Carib­
bean governments must be pre­
pared to assist its members to 
progress beyond the low end of 
production. Despite a significant 
amount of garment-sewing in the 
Caribbean, few local entrepreneurs 
have so progressed. In direct con­
trast stand the newly industrialized 
countries of Asia, where entrepre­
neurs who began at the low end of 
the production chain have com­
monly advanced—with substantial 
state support—to the high end. In­
deed, even if the Caribbean should 
prove successful in attracting for­
eign manufacturing investment, 
Asian evidence points to the state’s 
role in nurturing such a domestic 
entrepreneurial class as crucial to 
translating foreign investment into 
sustained local development.
The potential losses to Carib­
bean countries from the formation 
of a North American free-trade 
area may force regional leaders to 
deepen and broaden the Carib­
bean integration movement. So 
far, this movement had not moved 
beyond the level of a customs 
union, and involves only the for­
mer British colonies. Not that a 
deepened and broadened regional 
bloc will, by itself, solve the eco­
nomic problems of the Caribbean. 
Nevertheless, it may mitigate some 
of the adverse consequences of a 
North American free-trade agree­
ment. ■
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Reports: Trade and Development
Mexico: Campesinos and Coffee
by Luis Hernandez and David Bray
COFFEE ZONESn the fall of 1990 a ship filled with Brazilian coffee arrived at 
Veracruz, Mexico. There was 
nothing in Mexico’s new im­
port regulations, aggressively 
streamlined in a unilateral 
rush to promote a free-trade agree­
ment with the US, to stop its entry. 
Somebody in the Mexican bureau­
cracy got nervous, however, and 
the ship was not allowed to unload.
Brazilian coffee is just one of the 
many threats to Mexico’s small cof­
fee farmers. The collapse of the In­
ternational Coffee Agreement in 
July 1989, the subsequent dive in 
world coffee prices, a severe freeze 
in December 1989, and the acceler­
ating privatization of the Instituto 
Mexicano de Cafe (INMECAFE) have 
combined to drive small coffee 
farmers into liberalized markets 
loaded with debt.
Mexico’s small coffee growers 
are not enthusiastic about privatiza­
tion, yet some of their organiza­
tions, particularly affiliates of the 
Coordinadora National de Organiza­
tions Cafeteleras (CNOC), are ready 
to accept its challenges. What they 
need, however, are the means to 
find a competitive niche in the 
international market. Coffee is 
Mexico’s third largest generator of 
foreign exchange, and an esti­
mated 2 million rural Mexicans— 
mostly Indian and poor—live off its 
production. For them, privatization
Luis Hernandez is the coordinator for 
Servicios de Apoyo Local al Desarrollo 
de Base, A. C., in Mexico City. David 
Bray is the foundation representative 
for Mexico with the Inter-American 
Foundation. The views presented in this 
article are not necessarily those of these 
institutions.
means they must swiftly master the 
intricacies of international trade. 
They must come to grasp what hap­
pens to their coffee once it leaves 
their farm gates, and learn to do 
whatever is possible to influence 
that process.
Intervention: Top-Down
The privatization of INMECAFE, 
one of many state enterprises be­
ing shed in the neoliberal cam­
paign of President Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari, dramatically changes 
the market context in which small 
coffee producers operate. Founded 
in 1958 as a technical assistance 
and research agency, INMECAFE 
expanded in the mid-1970s as one 
of the populist initiatives of the 
Luis Echevarria administration.
Prior to INMECAFE, marketing 
was monopolized by coffee czars 
such as the notorious Justo Fer­
nandez of Veracruz, who com­
manded a huge network that 
bought coffee berries dirt-cheap 
from unschooled campesinos living 
days from the nearest road. In the 
mid-1970s INMECAFE began to 
stretch its wings to address this 
issue under the direction of Fausto 
Cantu Pena. On the international 
front, Cantu Pena sought Third 
World solidarity in commodity mar­
kets, even considering a possible al­
liance of coffee-producing nations 
with OPEC. In Mexico INMECAFE 
actively intervened in the produc­
tion and marketing of coffee, or­
ganizing small coffee producers to 
receive credit and technical assis­
tance. It also marketed their crops 
for them, freeing many of the small 
farmers from the grip of coyotes, the 
Mexican term for exploitative inter­
mediaries. Cantu Pena himself fell 
victim to what he has called “sexen­
nial cannibalism”—the corruption
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associated with Mexico’s six-year 
presidential terms—spending four 
years in Reclusorio Norte prison on 
charges of corruption. Despite this 
setback, INMECAFE continued to 
expand. By the harvest cycle of 
1980-81, INMECAFE controlled 
40% of Mexico’s coffee exports, in­
cluding the majority of the campe­
sinos' production.
During the 1980s, however, 
the hostility of the large exporters 
and shifts in state policy caused 
INMECAFE’s fortunes to decline. 
By the end of the decade its per­
centage of Mexico’s coffee exports 
had plunged to less than 10%.
Most tellingly, the vast majority of 
its small-farmer clientele had come 
to regard INMECAFE as just an­
other coyote, while marketing losses 
had inflated its debt to some $57 
million. An internal report defined 
its operations as “highly inefficient, 
oversized, with little internal con­
trol.” Although the desincorporacion 
(the government’s euphemism for 
privatization) of INMECAFE was 
slated to take place over three to 
five years, the organization’s rapid 
accumulation of debt has led the 
government to accelerate the pro­
cess to a matter of months.
Intervention: Bottom-Up
The disappearance of INMECAFE, 
accompanied by the destabilization 
of the world coffee market, is pro­
foundly changing relations be­
tween the state, the market, and 
small coffee producers. In this con­
text, CNOC has emerged as the 
major response of the autonomous 
campesino organizations. CNOC, 
which claims to have 20 affiliated 
organizations and nearly 50,000 
members, is struggling to learn 
how to manage all aspects of coffee 
production, marketing, and export­
ing. It is also striving to maintain 
participatory dynamics in its mem­
ber organizations, a challenge no 
private exporters have to address.
CNOC is based on organi­
zational efforts at the grassroots 
level in various states, principally 
Chiapas, Guerrero, and Veracruz,
Top: Coffee harvesting in Chiltoyac, Veracruz. Bottom: Coffee processing at El Castillo plant 
near Jalapa, Veracruz (Photos by Anne Temes)
since the late 1970s. Activist exten­
sion agents, priests, and students 
spread throughout the countryside 
during the 1970s, trying to rein- 
vigorate Mexican democracy and 
to encourage grassroots economic 
initiatives. For coffee-producing 
campesinos, INMECAFE’s pricing
policies and services provoked pro­
tests as well as organizing cam­
paigns. Regional organizations 
such as the Union de Uniones de 
Ejidos in Chiapas and the Union de 
Productores del Cafe in Veracruz 
formed in the early 1980s around 
these issues. In 1982 the Union de
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Productores mobilized 10,000 coffee 
producers for a series of demonstra­
tions capped by an occupation of 
the INMECAFE offices.
Rural organizational traditions 
permitted these groups to mobilize 
forces rapidly, enter into confronta­
tions audaciously, and negotiate 
short-term gains. Nevertheless, 
they did not help in the methodi­
cal, long-term task of building a sus­
tainable organization. Not until the 
late 1980s did the most advanced 
groups begin to carry out locally 
controlled rural development pro­
grams. These involved alternative 
health care, services for women, 
road construction, and provision of 
electricity, which complemented 
basic efforts to take direct control 
of the production and marketing 
of coffee.
In 1988 these regional organi­
zations began to form a national 
network around their common con­
cern with coffee. A meeting of cof­
fee producers at the Universidad 
Autonoma de Chapingo in October
1988 led to the first negotiations be­
tween INMECAFE and a represen­
tative group of producers speaking 
as a national organization. In July
1989 the first national meeting of 
coffee organizations was held in 
Lachiviza, Oaxaca, which resulted 
in the signing of the Convenio de 
Unidad y Action by 25 organizations 
in six Mexican states. In the same 
month, CNOC opened an office in 
Mexico City.
The nascent national organiza­
tion was immediately shaken by the 
rupture of the International Coffee 
Agreement in July 1989 and the 
consequent downward slide of cof­
fee prices. These events shoved 
CNOC into a struggle on multiple 
fronts: to improve the quality and 
marketing of its product; to gain 
legitimacy with the Mexican govern­
ment; and to consolidate demo­
cratic organizations.
In CNOC’s second national 
meeting, held in Chiltoyac, Vera­
cruz, in October 1989, the organi­
zation articulated three lines of 
action: producer participation in 
decisionmaking on the restruc­
turing and desincorporatidn of 
INMECAFE; use of a trust fund 
collected from a tax on coffee ex­
ports (now called Fideicomiso del 
Cafe [FIDECAFE]) to support the 
collection and marketing of coffee; 
and the establishment by CNOC of 
a national exporting firm working 
on behalf of small coffee farmers.
In January 1991 CNOC directly ex­
ported coffee produced by its mem­
bers, following the example of the 
several regional organizations that 
had been exporting for several 
years. Later that year, CNOC began 
to market its own brand of toasted 
coffee, Aztec Harvests, in the US. 
Several of the affiliated organiza­
tions have been expanding produc­
tion in organic coffee, looking for 
new market niches and ecologically 
sound production techniques.
In spite of CNOC’s major 
strides, the task it faces could well 
prove overpowering. For example, 
it appears that FIDECAFE will be­
come just another line of credit, 
out of reach for most small farm­
ers. Moreover, though the Salinas 
government has announced plans 
to turn over INMECAFE’s infra­
structure to the campesino organi­
zations, it refuses to confront the 
issue that most concerns them: 
their debts, or the fact that most of 
INMECAFE’s coffee-processing 
plants are too large for the campe­
sino organizations to manage. In 
the meantime, most small coffee 
producers remain, at best, ineffec­
tively organized. Undoubtedly it is 
the small growers who will be the 
biggest losers in the privatization of 
Mexico’s coffee industry. ■
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Boom, Bust, and Chicle
by Andres Oppenheimer
For many decades, Uaxactun, a jungle village in the heart of Guate­mala’s tropical forest, had only one source of in­come: its people sold 
chicle from the area’s trees to ma­
jo r US chewing-gum companies. In 
recent years, however, a shift to syn­
thetic gum by manufacturers has 
brought havoc to Uaxactun and 
nearby hamlets. ‘Things are not 
what they used to be,” lamented 
Jose Mendoza Enriquez, 74, who 
began extracting chicle for the 
Chicago-based Wrigley Company 
more than 20 years ago. “When 
Wrigley left, the world came to a 
sudden end for us.”
This remote village about 375 
miles north of Guatemala City 
once had a landing strip where 
cargo planes from the capital came 
several times a month to pick up 
the gum shipments. There also was 
a general store. The Aviateca air­
line office in the village had a radio 
transmitter, which residents could 
use to seek help in emergencies. At 
one point, there was even talk of 
bringing electricity, water, and per­
haps a telephone line to Uaxactun.
Today, Uaxactun’s main links to 
civilization are gone. The village 
consists mainly of two rows of 
wooden shacks divided by an emp­
ty grass field that was once the air­
strip. The general store has been 
converted into a town hall. The 
radio transmitter has disappeared— 
nobody knows how or where. The 
dirt road to the nearest town,
Tikal, is flooded most of the year.
Andres Oppenheimer, a member of 
Hemisphere’s editorial advisory 
board, is a Latin America correspon­
dent for the Miami Herald.
About 125 families live in 
Uaxactun, many of them immi­
grants from even more remote jun ­
gle villages that also were hurt by 
the gum crisis. Some continue ex­
tracting chicle for a Japanese chew­
ing-gum firm. Many have switched 
to marijuana cultivation to make a 
living.
A government worker who re­
cently established a forest conserva­
tion outpost in a neighboring zone 
said the place “looked like a ceme­
tery” when he arrived. ‘There were 
about 60 shacks, which were aban­
doned or destroyed,” he said.
“Some of the people had migrated 
south to Uaxactun, others had 
gone north to Mexico.”
The chicleros—as the men who 
climb the trees to extract gum are 
known—have long been the most 
respected men in their communi­
ties. To get the chicle, they have to 
go deep in the jungle during the 
rainy season, when the acrazapota 
tree produces the most sap, defy­
ing torrential rains and snakes. 
Then they transport the chicle on 
mule back to the nearest town— 
often a three or four-day trip 
through the jungle.
There are an estimated 2,000 
chicleros left in Guatemala’s Peten
region, down from more than
10.000 two decades ago, officials 
say. Guatemala’s chicle exports 
have dropped from 5 million 
pounds in the 1930s to about
950.000 pounds in 1990. Virtually 
all of Guatemala’s chicle exports 
go to Japan. Companies there are 
sticking to natural materials to pro­
duce a “gourmet gum” that is more 
expensive but tastes better than the 
synthetic one, Guatemalan officials 
say.
A spokesman for Wrigley says 
the firm switched to synthetic gum 
in 1981. ‘The price of chicle got to 
such a high level that it became 
prohibitive for us to use it,” he said.
Guatemalan forest officials are 
hoping to boost chicle sales in 
Japan and Europe, banking on the 
world trend toward natural foods. 
They say the chicleros are the best 
guarantee to stop the destruction 
of Guatemala’s tropical forest by 
lumber companies and squatters 
who torch trees to clear land for 
their crops. ‘T he chiclero cuts the 
tree, but doesn’t kill it,” said San­
tiago Billy, an official with the Gua­
temalan government’s natural 
resources agency CONAMA. “He 
knows the tree will recover in five 
years, and that he will be able to 
use it again then.”
But in Uaxactun, few expect 
the good old days of “La Wrigley,” 
as the company was known here, 
to come back. “Nobody comes here 
anymore,” said Mendoza Enriquez, 
the old-time chiclero who now runs 
a 47-man crew extracting chicle 
in Uaxactun. ‘This place is 
doomed.” ■
Editor’s Note: Adapted with permission 
from an article published in the Miami 
Herald (December 4, 1990).
Hemisphere •  Summer 1991
Reports: Trade and Development
Bush Administration Trade Policy
by Julius L. Katz
President George Bush’s speech of June 27,1990, laid out an ambitious long-term program for trade liberalization in the hemisphere. Over the 
months since the speech, we [the 
Bush administration] have been 
consulting with members of Con­
gress, business, labor, and other in­
terested groups in the US, and with 
the Latin American nations con­
cerned, to begin the process of im­
plementing the Initiative. We have 
reached some preliminary conclu­
sions about our basic approach 
and developed criteria for im­
plementing the policy.
Implementing the Initiative
Our approach has five main tenets. 
First, the US remains committed to 
the multilateral trading system.
The success of the Uruguay Round 
is of the utmost importance to our 
free-trade initiatives in the hemi­
sphere. The US cannot be the only 
market for Latin America, and out­
wardly oriented, competitive eco­
nomic policies are the best 
guarantee of continuing growth 
and development. The Uruguay 
Round must also be the venue for 
dealing with the agricultural Gor- 
dian knot, which certainly cannot 
be solved in the Western Hemi­
sphere alone. We anticipate that a 
failure of the Round would lead to 
an atmosphere far more conducive 
to protectionist and unilateral solu­
tions and more skeptical of trade 
liberalization.
Second, the proposed negotia­
tions on a free-trade agreement
Julius L. Katz is the deputy US trade 
representative.
(FTA) with Mexico and Canada 
will come first. Mexico is by far our 
largest trading partner in Latin 
America, and a close neighbor with 
which we share many economic in­
terests. As Bush stated in announc­
ing the participation of Canada in 
the North American free-trade 
negotiations, such an agreement 
would be “a dramatic first step to­
ward the realization of a hemi­
spheric free trade zone.” We would 
expect that whatever innovations 
in form or scope of a FTA that we 
develop in the North American 
free-trade process would be carried 
over to the later Enterprise for the 
Americas agreements as well.
The US cannot be the 
only market for Latin 
America, and 
outwardly oriented 
policies are the best 
guarantee of regional 
development.
Third, we are proceeding to con­
clude framework agreements on 
trade and investment with those 
countries and groups of countries 
that wish to work toward freer 
trade in the hemisphere. In fact, 
we began the trade liberalization 
process with Mexico in 1987 with 
the signing of just such a frame­
work agreement. Completion of a 
framework agreement with a coun­
try or group of countries does not 
imply that the US will be proposing
free-trade negotiations with such 
countries immediately, but it does 
establish a channel to explore vari­
ous trade liberalization options 
and promote the Enterprise for the 
Americas vision.
Fourth, and perhaps least appre­
ciated, we see the creation of a free- 
trade area for the hemisphere as 
taking many years and stretching 
into the next decade. The commit­
ment to open markets completely 
and on a reciprocal basis is a diffi­
cult one for any government to 
make. We know there will be many 
complications in negotiating such 
arrangements between the US and 
other countries in the hemisphere. 
As we explore possible opportuni­
ties and consider approaches, we 
believe it is essential to maintain a 
close consultative relationship with 
Congress.
Fifth, we should be prepared to 
negotiate with individual countries 
and in particular with groups of 
Latin American or Caribbean 
countries that associated to re­
move trade barriers among them­
selves. President Bush made this 
point in his June 27,1990, speech.
“.. . [T]he US stands ready to 
enter into free trade agreements 
with other markets in Latin Amer­
ica and the Caribbean—particu­
larly with groups of countries that 
have associated for purposes of 
trade liberalization.”
From the US perspective, nego­
tiating with an integrated, fully 
open market created by a number 
of contiguous countries is attractive 
because it will provide us with ac­
cess to a larger market and move 
us towards regional integration.
This does not rule out concluding 
bilateral agreements where these 
are appropriate (e.g., Chile). Bilat­
eral agreements can be a model
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and incentive for other countries 
to undertake needed reforms. Our 
overall objective remains to encour­
age countries in this hemisphere to 
increase trade among ourselves 
and reduce barriers to subregional 
trade as part of the overall process 
of promoting free trade through­
out the hemisphere.
Indicators of Readiness
Regarding the timing and pace of 
negotiations, a variety of economic 
and political factors will affect our 
recommendations. Again, I want to 
emphasize that any decisions to 
proceed will not be taken without 
consultations with Congress and, in 
particular, with the members of 
this committee.
To be a realistic candidate, a 
country or countries must have the 
institutional capacity to fulfill the 
long-term, serious commitments in­
volved, and the economic policies 
required for the success of the 
FTA. In particular, we would ex­
pect that a prospective partner be 
committed to a stable macroeco­
nomic environment and market-ori­
ented policies before negotiations 
begin.
Another aspect of readiness is a 
country’s commitment to the multi­
lateral trading system. We have 
been clear that we will only nego­
tiate agreements fully consistent 
with the provisions of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).
To ensure this linkage between 
GATT and the Enterprise for the 
Americas Initiative, we will look to 
see that our prospective FTA part­
ners have demonstrated progress 
in achieving open trade regimes 
and that they are members in good 
standing of GATT. Such a policy 
will also be helpful in assuring our 
nonregional trading partners that 
the Enterprise for the Americas Ini­
tiative is in their interest as well. ■
Editor’s Note: Edited excerpts of testi­
mony before the Committee on Finance, 
US Senate, April 24, 1991.
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Cuba’s Military Quandary
by Anne-Marie O’Connor
T he Cuban military has quietly retired more than 200 officers from a force with strong ties to a war hero executed by firing squad in 1989 on cocaine 
trafficking charges. Some believe 
the retirements were the most re­
cent purge of officers linked to 
Major General Arnaldo Ochoa 
Sanchez, who was executed with 
three other officers. Ochoa en­
joyed tremendous popularity 
among many officers of the so- 
called Ejercito Occidental—Cuba’s 
most powerful military force— 
which he commanded.
Some also speculated that the 
charismatic 57-year-old general 
could have become a threat to Cu­
ban leader Fidel Castro. Rumors 
that he and other officers were bid­
ding for power persist in Havana. 
“They’re getting rid of everything 
that smells of Ochoa,” said a mid­
level Cuban government official re­
lated to a recently ousted colonel.
“It appears to have been a 
purge,” a European diplomat said. 
‘T he same has not happened in 
any of Cuba’s other armies.” No 
revolutionary general alive more 
personified the image of the ro­
mantic, dashing “intemacionalista” 
than Ochoa, who Castro honored 
as a “Hero of the Cuban Republic” 
in 1984. In 1987-88 Ochoa com­
manded Cuban forces assisting 
Angola’s Marxist regime in its civil 
war against US and South African- 
backed rebels. That is why the re­
tirements in the Ejercito Occidental 
attracted so much diplomatic atten­
tion, particularly since they ap-
Anne-Marie O’Connor is a Latin Amer­
ica and Caribbean correspondent for 
Cox Newspapers.
peared to mainly affect officers 
who had served in Africa.
In July 1990 Cuba’s state-run 
Radio Rebelde reported that more 
than 100 officers from the Ejercito 
Occidental were retired. According 
to Radio Rebelde, in January 1991 
another group of officers was re­
tired, 70% of whom had served 
abroad. It mentioned that 109 dis­
tinguished service medals were 
passed out, indicating that at least 
that number of officers left army 
life.
An overriding concern 
is sustaining Cuba’s 
enormous military 
machine.
In the opinion of one Latin 
American diplomat, military cut­
backs are to be expected with the 
end of the Angola conflict, particu­
larly since the Cuban military was 
greatly expanded in the 1970s and 
1980s to play a role in that conflict. 
That does not, however, explain 
why the cuts are being made in 
only one sector. “It’s probable that 
there were people tied to Ochoa 
among them,” said the diplomat, 
who represents a country that 
has friendly relations with Cuba. 
“Ochoa had top commands in An­
gola and Ethiopia for a long time, 
and strong loyalties form under 
such circumstances. He galvanized 
the discontent of a certain group 
of officers, and his credentials—as 
a hero of the revolution and a mili­
tary commander—were very good. 
Ochoa was a threat to power, and 
Fidel is power. ”
The announcement of the re­
tirements followed an intriguing 
editorial in the June 1990 issue of 
Bastion, the Cuban army’s official 
magazine. The article concerned 
an internal review of “general prob­
lems of military discipline in the 
armed forces.” It also promised to 
“expose” deficiencies within the 
ranks, and that these shortcomings 
would be “identified with names 
and surnames, which will facilitate 
measures for eradicating them.”
Supporters Remain
Even Castro’s close allies were 
shocked by the court-martial and 
executions of Ochoa and the three 
other officers, the biggest domestic 
scandal since the 1959 revolution. 
There are still supporters of the 
Cuban revolution who privately de­
fend Ochoa, claiming he was not 
involved in drug trafficking for per­
sonal gain. “He did it all for the 
Ejercito Occidental—so they could 
live better, and have things like 
tape players and televisions,” said 
one government official who knew 
Ochoa personally. ‘T he revolution 
only addresses people’s spiritual 
needs, but they have material 
needs as well.”
Eliminating Ochoa and other 
potential challenges within the 
military is only one of Castro’s 
concerns. An overriding concern 
is sustaining the enormous Cuban 
military machine. Several problems 
are already quite apparent.
Like many US Vietnam veterans, 
Cuban soldier Victor Puentes was 
frustrated and bitter at his fate 
when he completed his combat 
tour in Angola. Puentes, 24, volun­
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teered for duty in Angola in 1987 
because he thought it would help 
him overcome a bad high school 
record that left him only two ca­
reer choices: the police or the 
military. When he was wounded by 
rebel shelling and decorated, he 
was certain he would attain his 
goal: admission to the Havana uni­
versity program that would train 
him in government administration.
Dashed Dreams
Puentes’s dream began to crumble 
during the three months he spent 
in a mental hospital for treatment 
for shell shock. “We were all doped 
up. They gave me modeling clay to 
play with, as if I was some kind of a 
nut. I just threw mine at the wall,” 
he said. When he returned to Cuba 
in 1989, he was again offered a 
common path for poor students: 
a job as a policeman. Dispirited, 
Puentes now works occasional con­
struction jobs.
Puentes, like more than half of 
the Cuban troops who served, is 
black. He believes his treatment is 
a symptom of racial prejudice.
“This is not fair,” he fumes, sitting 
in his sparse room in a colonial 
multifamily dwelling on a narrow 
Havana street. ‘They say racism was 
eradicated by the revolution, but 
this shows it still exists.”
Other Angola veterans content­
edly accept the high pay and perks 
offered to the corps of privileged 
hard hats building tourist hotels 
and the sports complex for the 
summer 1991 Pan American 
games. It beats life as a cop or a 
farm worker. Luis Angel Garcia, a 
member of the elite Bias Roca con­
struction brigade, makes as much 
in salary as some senior govern­
m ent officials by building Spanish- 
financed tourist hotels. He does 
not enjoy the same fringe benefits, 
like a car or roomy apartment.
Even so, he does not share other 
veterans’ frustrations. “I’m a com­
plete revolutionary,” Garcia said, 
“and I stand by everything (Cuban 
leader Fidel) Castro says. If the 
Yankees invade, I will grab a gun
and fight.” Another Bias Roca mem­
ber, Nicolas Leiva, 29, said service 
in Angola was “a true school of life” 
that deepened his commitment to 
the revolution.
Francisco Diaz, a 38-year-old cab 
driver and Angola veteran of an­
other generation, said veterans 
who complain today are too young 
to know the difficulties of life in 
the first years of the revolution and 
understand the advances that have 
been made. “They had it easy in An­
gola. They gave them tape players, 
music, good food, and nice places 
to stay,” said Diaz, shaking his 
head. “It was a true sacrifice for the 
troops when I was there. These 
kids are spoiled.”
These personal accounts reflect 
the story at the level of the average 
Cuban citizen: it is a complex situ­
ation with mixed emotions that 
makes prediction difficult. The 
macroeconomic realities, however, 
are more severe and will surely 
have an impact on the military.
A Step Backward
As Cuba struggles to cope with 
changes in the communist world,
it is facing another challenge at 
home—finding jobs for the thou­
sands of Angola veterans who have 
returned to a country beset by se­
vere economic crisis and drastically 
reduced opportunities for nearly 
everyone. Cuban economic plan­
ners are grappling furiously with 
the backlash caused by the switch 
to free-market trade by former so­
cialist allies. Thousands of workers 
have been laid off from state enti­
ties that are to be reduced by as 
much as 80%, and diminished 
Soviet oil shipments have forced 
factory closures.
“The two principal problems in 
Cuba are the youth and the mili­
tary,” said a European diplomat. 
‘They take people returning from 
Angola and put them to work in 
agriculture. Cutting (sugar) cane 
far away from home isn’t exactly 
what a captain had in mind, espe­
cially after a privileged life as an of­
ficer with a driver and assistants. It 
is a very serious problem, not be­
cause it could foment a civil war, 
but because it forms a very large 
base of social pressure at a time 
when industries are closing facto­
ries to save petroleum.” ■
The first teachers’ guide to explore Latin America and 
the Caribbean from a global perspective
Latin America and the Caribbean 
from a Global Perspective
A Resource Guide for Teachers
Pedro R. Bermudez and Barbara C. Cruz
This ten-part resource guide is a self-contained series of lessons on Latin 
America and the Caribbean based on the Hanvey model of global aware­
ness. The lessons focus upon economic development, human rights, 
immigration issues, the role of women, and environmental concerns. 
Price: $21.00
To order, please make check or money order (US currency only) payable to:
Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, University 
Park, Miami, FL 33199. (305) 348-2894; FAX (305) 348-3593.
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Reports: Politics
Democratic Transitions?
by Terry L. McCoy
uriname and Guyana 
share the same ambigu­
ous condition: they are in 
South America but not of
it. With populations of
___1_.  O C A  f\f\f\_____ ] < 7 C A  A A A
respectively, these two nations are 
the smallest on the continent, and 
their histories have rendered them 
even more marginal. They are the 
creations of Dutch and British colo­
nialism respectively, and are pop­
ulated largely by the descendants 
of African slaves and indentured 
Asians imported as plantation 
laborers. Independence came in 
1966 for Guyana, nine years later 
for Suriname.
Political developments in Suri­
name and Guyana in the late 1970s 
and most of the 1980s also ran 
counter to what was happening 
elsewhere in South America. In­
stead of moving toward democracy, 
they headed in the opposite direc­
tion. Suriname fell to military rule, 
while Guyana stagnated under a 
one-party regime. By the late 1980s 
political openings appeared in 
both countries. Liberalization con­
tinues, but functioning democra­
cies are not assured.
Suriname
Of the two, Suriname’s transition 
to democracy has been the more 
problematic. Its armed forces 
seized power on Christmas Eve of 
1990. Although they promised to 
hold elections within 100 days, 
skepticism regarding their real
Terry L. McCoy is a political scientist 
and director of the Center for Latin 
American Studies at the University of 
Florida. He has written extensively on 
the Caribbean.
character and intentions was well 
deserved since they had issued sim­
ilar pronouncements in August 
1980. At that time the army and its 
leader—Sergeant Desi Bouterse— 
overthrew the government, promis­
ing to end feuding and corruption 
and to return Suriname quickly to 
civilian hands. Instead Bouterse as­
sumed the presidency and pre­
sided over seven years of political 
repression and economic misman­
agement, the latter being carried 
out under the banner of Third 
World socialism. During the holi­
days of Christmas 1982 the regime 
apprehended, tortured, and then 
murdered 15 of its opponents.
The people of Suriname re­
sponded to the Christmas massa­
cre, the deteriorating economic 
situation, and a Maroon rebellion 
in the interior by leaving in large 
numbers. International attention, 
and pressure, was not long in com­
ing. The Dutch, who had quietly 
supported Bouterse’s takeover, sus­
pended their large development 
aid package in 1984, while Washing­
ton expressed its unhappiness over
Bouterse’s warm relations with 
Cuba and Libya. The alleged ties of 
the regime to cocaine trafficking 
also aggravated relations with the 
US. In the face of a growing Cuban 
presence on the South American 
continent, both Venezuela and Bra­
zil joined the diplomatic campaign 
against Bouterse. The escalating ex­
ternal pressure, plus Bouterse’s de­
lusion that he was in fact popular, 
led him to hold an election at the 
end of 1987. The organization 
formed to promote his candidacy— 
the New Democratic Party—was 
soundly defeated by the New 
Front, a coalition of traditional 
ethnic parties.
Despite losing the election, 
Bouterse retained much of his 
power, and the civilian government 
that was inaugurated in January 
1988 was forced to name him com­
mander of the armed forces. 
Bouterse proceeded to undercut 
the badly divided civilian authori­
ties at every turn and to intimidate 
the civilian population. When the 
ruling New Front rejected his call 
in late 1990 to incorporate the
Hemisphere •  Summer 1991
armed forces into the cabinet, 
Bouterse mobilized his troops to 
remove the constitutional govern­
ment.
Guyana
The news from neighboring Guya­
na is somewhat more encouraging, 
in spite of the country’s tenuous 
history of democracy. Since inde­
pendence, Guyana has been locked 
in the suffocating embrace of the 
People’s National Congress (PNC). 
Forbes Burnham’s PNC came to 
power with covert assistance from 
the US and Britain, both of whom 
feared another electoral victoryb
fair vote since the East Indians 
hold numerical superiority over 
the Creoles represented by the 
PNC. But the opposition and Guya­
nese in exile have been effective in 
mobilizing external pressure on 
the government to take the final 
steps toward elections. A break­
through occurred when Hoyte 
agreed to a visit by former US pres­
ident Jimmy Carter in October 
1990. Asked to serve as an inter­
national observer, Carter insisted 
on a firsthand examination of the 
electoral system.
The Hoyte government’s agree­
ment to undertake the two reforms 
recommended by Carter—a house-
Hemisphere
by Prime Minister George Price of 
Belize, helped clear the remaining 
obstacles to acceptable elections in 
the fall of 1991.
Point of Departure
Suriname and Guyana are both 
at critical points in their political 
development. Elections do not 
guarantee good government, but 
without them the two countries are 
guaranteed the continuation of 
bad governments. International 
concern and pressure have been 
instrumental in moving Guyana to­
ward genuinely meaningful elec­
tions for the first time in its history.
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Reports: Politics
Democratic Transitions?
by Terry L. McCoy
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armed forces into the cabinet, 
Bouterse mobilized his troops to 
remove the constitutional govern­
ment.
Guyana
The news from neighboring Guya­
na is somewhat more encouraging, 
in spite of the country’s tenuous 
history of democracy. Since inde­
pendence, Guyana has been locked 
in the suffocating embrace of the 
People’s National Congress (PNC). 
Forbes Burnham’s PNC came to 
power with covert assistance from 
the US and Britain, both of whom 
feared another electoral victory by 
Cheddi Jagan, the Marxist leader 
of Guyana’s East Indians. Ironically 
it was Burnham who led Guyana 
down a radical path, declaring it a 
“cooperative socialist republic” and 
establishing warm relations with 
the socialist bloc. Operating be­
hind a thin facade of parliamentary 
democracy, Burnham resorted to 
intimidation, gerrymandering, and 
electoral fraud to keep himself and 
the PNC in power.
When Burnham died in 1984, 
he was succeeded by his first vice 
president and prime minister,
Hugh Desmond Hoyte. The coun­
try Hoyte inherited has continued 
to decline economically. The real 
per capita income of Guyana is 
lower in 1991 than it was in 1960. 
The capital city of Georgetown is in 
a state of advanced physical decay 
with crumbling buildings, frequent 
power outages, and endemic street 
crime. Tens of thousands of Guya­
nese have emigrated, settling in 
the US and Canada. In desperate 
need of international assistance, 
Hoyte moderated the policies of 
his predecessor, adopting more 
market-oriented economic policies 
and liberalizing the political cli­
mate.
Yet the Hoyte government re­
sisted the free and fair elections de­
manded by opposition politicians, 
who pointed out that Hoyte’s man­
date rested on the rigged elections 
of 1985. It was assumed that elec­
toral opponent Jagan would win a
fair vote since the East Indians 
hold numerical superiority over 
the Creoles represented by the 
PNC. But the opposition and Guya­
nese in exile have been effective in 
mobilizing external pressure on 
the government to take the final 
steps toward elections. A break­
through occurred when Hoyte 
agreed to a visit by former US pres­
ident Jimmy Carter in October 
1990. Asked to serve as an inter­
national observer, Carter insisted 
on a firsthand examination of the 
electoral system.
The Hoyte government’s agree­
ment to undertake the two reforms 
recommended by Carter—a house- 
to-house voter enumeration to up­
date registration lists and the 
counting of ballots at the polling 
place instead of at a central loca­
tion—gave hope that the way had 
finally been cleared for national 
elections acceptable to all parties. 
Though the government subse­
quently appeared to maneuver to 
scuttle the possibility of honest elec­
tions, a second international mis­
sion in March and April 1991, led
by Prime Minister George Price of 
Belize, helped clear the remaining 
obstacles to acceptable elections in 
the fall of 1991.
Point of Departure
Suriname and Guyana are both 
at critical points in their political 
development. Elections do not 
guarantee good government, but 
without them the two countries are 
guaranteed the continuation of 
bad governments. International 
concern and pressure have been 
instrumental in moving Guyana to­
ward genuinely meaningful elec­
tions for the first time in its history. 
Outside scrutiny was likewise deci­
sive in forcing the armed forces of 
Suriname to honor its pronounce­
ment on elections. Held on May 
25,1991, they returned Suriname 
to civilian rule. The international 
community must now insist that 
the elected officials be given the 
power to govern, an essential step 
toward the synchronization of local 
political currents with regional 
democratic transitions. ■
Mexican Academic Clearing House 
(MACH)
Materiales Academicos de Consulta 
Hispanoamericana/Mexican Academic Clearing House (MACH) 
has been exporting library materials worldwide since 1969.
• M ACH  sells single and multiple copies of Mexican books 
and serials, including government publications.
• M ACH  handles selective blanket order services for 
academic libraries.
• M ACH  gives free referral service and periodical book 
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(915) 674-07-79. Fax number (915) 673-62-09.
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Insider briefs on people and institutions 
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs
Abortion Follow-Up
On the heels of the state of 
Chiapas’s decision to legalize 
abortion in December 1990, an­
other Mexican state is debating the 
legalization of abortion. Officials in 
the state of Quintana Roo recently 
introduced a new abortion law that 
was opposed, not surprisingly, by 
the Catholic Church and the right- 
wing Partido Action National. An un­
expected objection came, however, 
from the leftist Partido de Revolution 
Democratica (PRD). According to 
the Latin American Weekly Report 
(March 21, 1991), the PRD joined 
the conservative anti-abortion coali­
tion out of fears that the new law 
would not prevent veterinarians 
from issuing the medical certificate 
required as a prerequisite for an 
abortion.
■
Caribbean AIDS
“AIDS in the Caribbean,” pub­
lished in Courier (March-April 
1991), surveys the impact of, and 
attitudes toward, AIDS in the 
English-speaking Caribbean. The 
author, Elizabeth White, points out 
the general population’s hesitance 
to use condoms as protection 
against the spread of the disease. 
According to White, “. . .  it is still 
common to hear a man or woman 
say that they will now use a con­
dom with their ‘outside m an/ 
woman’ but that they are reluctant 
to use one with their ‘main m an/ 
woman’ as this would indicate to 
their partner that they have an out­
side relationship or that they sus­
pect that their partner has one.”
Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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Fidel: “Just Say No”
Readers across the US are receiv­
ing a flyer advertising a new publi­
cation: the “End of the Cuban 
Connection.” Nothing unusual 
about that, except that it isn’t from 
Random House, Harper & Row, or 
even the Council on Drug Abuse. 
It’s from Havana’s Jose Marti Pub­
lishing House. The publication is 
the Cuban government’s explana­
tion of the trial and execution of 
much-decorated General Arnaldo 
Ochoa—a “hero of the revolution,” 
no less—who was implicated in nar­
cotics trafficking by Fidel Castro 
himself. The flyer declares that Cas­
tro has been “extremely puritani­
cal” about drugs, and goes on to 
paint the Cuban leader as the origi­
nal “just say no” kind of guy. “Fidel 
gets high on revolution, Cuban 
rum and his own rhetoric,” claims 
the circular, leaving readers to won­
der if the items are in the right 
order.
There’s No Place like Home
Even as the number of rafters 
leaving Cuba and safely arriving 
in South Florida has catapulted 
from 467 in all of 1990 to more 
than 1,000 so far during 1991, 
some rafters are trying to return to 
Cuba. One rafter, who survived the 
Florida Straits crossing in May
1990, is jobless and sleeps in a 
friend’s 1981 Chevrolet. The refu­
gee told the Miami Herald (June 14, 
1991), “I’ve applied for jobs every­
where, but no one calls. There’s 
nothing. I won’t steal, so I prefer to 
go back to Cuba.” A father, who ar­
rived by raft in April 1990, and his 
son, who arrived a month later, are 
both jobless and facing eviction
from their Hialeah, Florida, apart­
ment. The father told the Herald 
(June 15,1991), “To be exploited, 
to live poorly and barely get by, I 
can do that in my own land and 
with my family.”
Sweet Exports
The Banco Central of Nicaragua is 
now publishing the monthly Nica­
ragua Economic Report. According 
to the inaugural edition (March 
1991), the publication provides “a 
window on events and activities in 
both the public and private sectors 
which are transforming the eco­
nomic system of our nation.” What 
are the agents of the economy’s 
transformation? The Report ob­
serves that melons will be the first 
Nicaraguan export to the US since 
1985. More than 1,200 acres of 
honeydew and cantaloupe were 
scheduled to be exported to the 
US market in the late spring of
1991.
Spring Cleaning
Built in Mexico in 1933, the 18th 
of March refinery accounted for 
about 7% of the country’s oil refin­
ing capacity. But it also accounted 
for about 88,000 tons of contami­
nants into the city’s thin, smog- 
choked air. To illustrate his 
commitment to fighting air pol­
lution, Mexican president Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari ordered an im­
mediate shutdown of the refinery 
on March 18,1991. His next target 
will be the city’s 40,000 taxis, all of 
which will be fitted with catalytic 
converters in the next two years.
Terminator
The Washington-based Council on 
Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) has 
published a critique of the Na­
tional Endowment for Democracy 
(NED) (April 17,1991). The cri­
tique asserts that NED needs closer 
oversight from Congress because 
of the organization’s inability to 
provide systematic and thorough 
reviews of its grantees. According 
to COHA, NED has “conducted 
backdoor operations” and uses a 
“secretive manner.” COHA’s solu­
tion? It endorsed a bill (H.R. 117) 
filed by Representative Paul Kan- 
jorski (D-PA) that mandates the 
“termination” of NED to avoid wast­
ing taxpayer dollars “on a leftover 
dinosaur from the past days of the 
evil empire.”
Hernan Cortez, by Oliver Stone
Movie director Oliver Stone has 
tapped US actor Willem Dafoe as 
the star for his new film project on 
Hernan Cortez, the Spanish con­
quistador. The new project will be 
supported by the government of 
Mexico and the Comision National 
of Spain, and is one of 12 cinema 
projects being sponsored by the 
Sodedad Estatal of Spain.
■
El Puma
From Caracas, popular singer Jose 
Luis Rodriguez (“El Puma”) has an­
nounced a new campaign to pro­
mote US tourism in Latin America. 
Known as “Go South America,” the 
campaign will feature El Puma him­
self as the program’s spokesman.
£No hay huevos rancheros?
Responding to changing demo­
graphics in the US, McDonald’s is 
now adding breakfast burritos and 
chicken fajitas to its fast-food 
menu. According to one fast-food 
market research firm, restaurant 
sales of Mexican food grew at a 
compounded rate of 8.6% during 
the late 1980s, or about four times 
as fast as the sale of hamburgers. 
Taco Bell is leading the Mexican 
fast-food charge. The company’s 
sales grew by 19% in 1990.
All that Jazz and More
Michel Camilo, a jazz pianist born 
in the Dominican Republic, is re­
ceiving rave reviews for his latest 
album, On the Other Hand (Epic 
Records). Trained at the National 
Conservatory of the Dominican 
Republic and later at the Juilliard 
and Manes schools of music, Ca­
milo was first noticed while he was 
playing in saxophonist Paquito 
D’Rivera’s band in the early 1980s. 
Perhaps better known in Europe 
than in the US, Camilo blends 
Caribbean rhythms into his con­
temporary jazz compositions. The 
musician’s buoyant sound is fast 
becoming a trademark of the new 
Latin jazz.
Strange Bedfellows?
One of the hottest applied re­
search projects in Latin America 
has recently been completed in 
Bogota, Colombia. Titled “Bogota 
Needs Red Light Districts,” the 
$150,000-study found there are
14,211 female prostitutes and 1,087 
brothels in a 900-square block area 
of downtown Bogota. A truly inter­
disciplinary team—sociologists, 
psychologists, and prostitutes—con­
ducted the actual research. The 
project was commissioned by the 
city’s button-down chamber of 
commerce, whose president, Mario 
Suarez Melo, told one US reporter 
(The Miami Herald, July 8, 1991) 
that “Bogota is an immense red 
light district” that needs to be 
regulated.
On the Move
Robert Kurz, formerly on the staff 
of Congressmen Michael Barnes 
and Richard Gephardt, has been 
appointed to the Subcommittee on 
Legislation and National Security 
of the Committee on Government 
Operations of the US House of 
Representatives.
Ramon Daubon has been named 
program representative for the 
Ford Foundation in Santiago, 
Chile. Daubon, who received his 
Ph.D. in economics from the Uni­
versity of Pittsburgh, worked with 
the Inter-American Foundation as 
representative for Chile and Ar­
gentina in 1981-85. Prior to his ap­
pointment, he was vice president 
for the National Puerto Rican Co­
alition in Washington.
Donna Hrinak, formerly deputy 
chief of mission at the US Embassy 
in Honduras and political coun­
selor at the US embassy in Vene­
zuela, has been named deputy 
assistant secretary of state for the 
Caribbean and Mexico.
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Corrupt to the Core
by Mario Diament
Against a backdrop of debt crisis, capital flight, and growing poverty, the burden 
of corruption weighs heavily upon the lives of Latin Americans
T he downfall of Antonio Erman Gonzalez in Janu­ary 1991—Argentina’s third minister of the econ­omy since Carlos Menem assumed the presidency a 
year and a half before—was caused 
by more than one circumstance. 
Undoubtedly, however, the main 
cause was corruption. Precipitating 
Erman Gonzalez’s resignation was 
the disclosure of US Ambassador 
Terence Todman’s letter to him on 
December 10,1990, complaining 
that the US-based Swift-Armour 
company was being pressured by 
Argentine government officials for 
payoffs to expedite imports of nec­
essary machinery. The person who 
offered to be the intermediary for 
that transaction was President 
Menem’s brother-in-law and advi­
sor, Emir Yoma.
Menem’s immediate reaction to 
Todman’s letter was to accuse the 
executives of Swift-Armour—and in- 
direcdy Ambassador Todman—of 
orchestrating a campaign to dis­
credit Argentina. When the US De­
partment of State confirmed the 
letter’s contents, Menem replied 
that “the State Department is more 
preoccupied with what is happen­
ing in Argentina than with what is
Mario Diament, an Argentine play­
wright and journalist, is a columnist 
with El Nuevo Herald in Miami.
happening in the US, where cor­
ruption cases are really alarming.” 
Menem was correct in his assess­
ment of the magnitude of corrup­
tion in the US. He was wrong, 
though, in comparing it with cor­
ruption in Argentina and, by ex­
tension, with corruption in Latin 
America. In the case of the US, cor­
ruption exists within the system; 
whereas in the case of Argentina 
and Latin America, corruption is 
the system.
In the case of the US, 
corruption exists 
zwihin the system. 
In the case of Latin 
America, corruption is 
the system.
The distinction is not merely 
semantic. It refers to the more fun­
damental issue of the differences 
that exist between the work ethic 
and the mentality of Latin Amer­
icans and North Americans. Some
recent cases of corruption in the 
US, such as the savings-and-loan sit­
uation, involve billions of dollars 
with long-lasting and disastrous 
consequences. Five prestigious US 
senators, including a former presi­
dential candidate, have been inves­
tigated because of their ties with at 
least one delinquent savings-and- 
loan, and no less than President 
George Bush’s son, Neil, has been 
indicted because of his role in an­
other.
This, however, is a case of cor­
ruption within the system. As despi­
cable as the case is, the system’s 
foundations remain intact, thus 
enabling it to purge itself. Even 
though corrupt government offi­
cials, police officers, and judges 
exist, their presence constitutes an 
exception and not the rule. More­
over, the US system displays not 
only the strict separation of pow­
ers, but also a widespread moral 
conviction regarding duty, responsi­
bility, and obedience to law and 
order. This separation of powers 
and moral conviction ensure that 
the US system can outlive and tran­
scend its own perversions.
On the other hand, corruption 
in Latin America is not merely a so­
cial deviation, it is a way of life. 
Abuse of power is so naturally in­
corporated into society that to mod­
ify it would require major surgery 
on a national level. In Latin Amer­
ica, then, the system is unable to
20 Hemisphere • Summer 1991
u R E S
purge itself from its perversions be­
cause they are precisely the founda­
tion upon which it is built.
Corruption is not just an Argen­
tine phenomenon. In Venezuela 
they call it tajadcr, in Mexico, mor- 
dida\ in Peru, pagos; and in Argen­
tina, coima. Each country coins 
corruption differently, but the 
principle is everywhere the same.
In Venezuela, for example, the situ­
ation has gone so far that the first 
volume of a Diccionario de la corrup- 
cion, 1959-1979'was, recently pub­
lished in Caracas. The volume 
presents 60 leading cases of govern­
ment corruption in alphabetical 
order. (Volume two will be pub­
lished shortly.) And in Mexico, 
where an estimated 80% of all busi­
nesses and individuals are tax evad­
ers, only two cases of tax evasion 
were prosecuted by federal authori­
ties between 1921 and 1988.
In Latin America, the individual 
and the law are so blatantly es­
tranged from one another that judi­
cial pronouncements are looked 
upon as acts of whim or conven­
ience rather than expressions of 
justice. If Latin Americans are quiz­
zical about the law, it is because 
their daily life is a necessary con­
catenation of violations.
The primary reason for this con­
dition is not the widely held belief 
that Latin Americans are by nature 
anarchic. It is, rather, the abusive 
and wanton manner in which those 
in power have historically applied 
the law: as an instrument for exer­
cising their power rather than for 
carrying out justice. It is thus no 
surprise that the maxim, “hecha la 
ley, hecha la trampa” (“where there is 
a law, there is a trap”) seems to 
have taken hold as the first amend­
ment of Latin America’s unspoken 
constitution.
Latin Americans have an onto­
logical sense that the shortest dis­
tance between two points is not 
necessarily a straight line. In order 
to accomplish any sort of transac­
tion, the first step is to find a 
friend, then a well-positioned per­
son who takes bribes. Only then 
can the transaction relevantly pro­
ceed. The bribe, therefore, is the 
price of participating in a system 
where all negotiations are con­
trolled by the powerful.
Latin Americans have 
an ontological seme 
that the shortest 
distance between 
two points is not 
necessarily a straight 
line. In order to 
accomplish any sort of 
transaction, the first 
step is to find a friend, 
then a well-positioned 
person who takes 
bribes.
Latin Americans are so im­
mersed in corruption—large and 
small, official and personal—that 
they have become desensitized to 
its numerous manifestations. The 
police officers who rob or the 
judges who take bribes are no
longer outcasts of the system: they 
are the system. Latin Americans 
have become so convinced that 
these day-to-day immoralities are in­
dispensable for survival in the jun ­
gle that they fail to see their own 
role in sustaining it.
The Maradona Affair
The case of international soccer 
star Diego Maradona exemplifies 
the dangers and perfidies natural 
to such a jungle. It illustrates the 
subtle ways in which an apparently 
insignificant episode may be used 
to cover up a corruption scandal 
implicating top government offi­
cials and members of a president’s 
immediate family.
The life of Diego Armando 
Maradona is the classic tale of the 
rise and fall of a pop culture hero. 
The oldest of an illiterate peon’s 
seven children, Maradona parlayed 
his breathtaking skills on the soc­
cer field into an escape from the 
wretched poverty of metropolitan 
Buenos Aires. As a mere 16-year- 
old, ElPibe de Oro (“the Golden 
Boy”) galvanized the public’s emo­
tion during Argentina’s victory 
over Hungary. Later he rocketed to 
fortune, signing with Barcelona for 
a world-record $10 million. In one 
play during the 1986 World Cup he 
danced around six British defend­
ers, scoring a goal for the text­
books. A player without peer, he 
then led Naples to three consecu­
tive championships.
This is the Maradona who daz­
zled the world. The Maradona who 
chartered a plane to je t his friends 
from Rome to Buenos Aires for his 
million-dollar wedding. Whose 
charisma led President Menem to 
name him sports ambassador of 
Argentina.
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Then came the fall. First there 
were discipline problems in the Na­
ples team and rumors of a dissolute 
life. Then there was a confronta­
tion with Joao Havelange, presi­
dent of the International Soccer 
Federation. In March 1991 the Ital­
ian Soccer Federation announced 
the suspension of Maradona for 15 
months after tests indicated recent 
drug use. Finally, on April 26, Mara­
dona was arrested while using co­
caine with two childhood friends in 
a ramshackle Buenos Aires apart­
ment.
The media shifted from the glo­
rious image of Maradona’s out­
stretched arms accepting a 
championship trophy to the trag­
edy and disgrace of the hero’s drug- 
dilated pupils. The international 
press labeled Maradona the “fallen 
angel.” Yet something seems amiss 
in this story—a curious temporal 
progression, a bothersome chain of 
events that leads one to look be­
yond the personal tragedy of 
Maradona to the wider political 
context of Argentina in crisis. For 
instance, was it by chance that the 
police raided the apartment where 
Maradona happened to be using 
cocaine?
According to police sources, 
suspicion of narcotics trafficking 
had led the police to stake out the 
apartment for a week. Some initial 
versions indicate Maradona was 
apprehended there by coinci­
dence. Yet later versions indicate 
that the Superintmdmcia deDrogas 
Peligrosas de la Policia Federal had 
been tracking Maradona for sev­
eral days. A story in the Buenos 
Aires daily Clarin claims that agents 
of the US Drug Enforcement Ad­
ministration participated in the 
operation.
Why would the Argentine po­
lice—overwhelmed as they have 
been by a crime wave that op­
presses Buenos Aires, as well as by 
many major cases of corruption in­
volving entrepreneurs, politicians, 
television stars, and government 
bureaucrats—devote precious time 
and resources to tracking and ar­
resting a national hero for the rela­
tively minor crime of personal drug 
use? After all, Maradona did not ap­
pear to have been involved in drug 
trafficking. His behavior, while car­
rying stiff punishment Under Ar­
gentine law, was no threat to 
society; the primary victim of his 
behavior was Maradona himself. 
Anyone reasonably familiar with Ar­
gentina knows that the Maradona 
drug bust was highly unusual, that
Something seems 
amiss in the 
Maradona story, a 
bothersome chain of 
events that leads one 
to look beyond the 
personal tragedy of 
Maradona to the 
wider political context 
of Argentina in crisis.
the striking violation of various 
unwritten codes raises more ques­
tions than it answers. For instance, 
it is customary that in a typical po­
lice case involving a celebrity, deci­
sions are transferred to higher 
levels of authority, and can even be 
handled by the president himself. 
This means that, if the police had 
encountered Maradona unexpect­
edly, they would have done every­
thing in their power to remove him 
from the scene without calling at­
tention to his presence.
What happened, however, was 
just the opposite: the police de­
tained Maradona after calling the 
press. Clearly they sought the wid­
est publicity possible. Why? Who 
stood to gain from a publicity coup 
of this magnitude? Is it just coinci­
dence that as Maradona was being 
arrested for cocaine use, a major 
scandal stemming from the alleged 
participation of members of Presi­
dent Menem’s own family in a nar­
cotics trafficking operation came 
under investigation by the Spanish 
ministry of justice? New evidence 
was appearing daily regarding 
Argentina’s transformation into a 
haven for the laundering of drug 
money, and Washington was pres­
suring the Menem government to 
take a serious stand against narco­
traffickers.
These problems seemed to 
reach a peak during the very week 
Maradona was taken into custody. 
First, on April 19, the minister of 
economy, Domingo Cavallo, had to 
postpone a trip to the US and Eu­
rope in the face of growing criti­
cism over Argentina’s lack of 
action against narcotraffickers. On 
the 20th the influential newspaper 
La Nation featured a headline pro­
claiming that there was “Growing 
Official Concern about Drug Traf­
ficking,” and reported that the US 
government was pressuring the 
Menem administration to permit 
Argentina’s armed forces to partici­
pate in a campaign against narco- 
traffickers. On the 25th the Wall 
Streetfoumal published an article 
entitled “Drugs: The Argentine 
Connection,” which provoked 
great concern among Argentine 
authorities in light of the foum al s 
international prestige. On the 26th 
the police arrested Maradona.
Surely the “Golden Boy” was 
taken by surprise. He was accus­
tomed to hard play. But this was a 
different kind of game, and he 
didn’t know the rules. ■
Editor’s Note: Extracted from two col­
umns (February 7 and May 2, 1991) of 
El Nuevo Herald.
(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
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Fuente de la India, Havana.
Cuba in the 1850s 
Through the Lens of 
Charles DeForest Fredricks
Robert M. Levine 
“Previously unpublished, these 
s .  photographs document a
turning point in Cuban life, 
as the island was on the 
verge of social, economic, 
and technological moder­
nity. .. .This intriguing 
little album will delight 
! both students of Latin 
American history and pho­
tography buffs.”—Booklist 
University of South Florida Press
Jamaican Sayings cioth $22.95
With Notes on Folklore, 
Aesthetics, & Social Control
G. Llewellyn Watson
“A rich and compelling collection that will make a signif­
icant contribution to the study of Jamaican/West Indian/ 
black folklore and culture.”—Daryl Cumber Dance, 
Virginia Commonwealth University
Florida A & M University Press 
January 272 pp. 6 X 9 Cloth $29.95
Conchtown USA
Bahamian Fisherfolk in Riviera Beach, Florida
Photographs and Text by Charles C. Foster 
Folk Songs and Tales collected by Veronica Huss 
“The combination of folklore, oral history, and photo­
graphs makes this a work of interest to general readers and 
scholars alike.”—Stetson Kennedy
Florida Atlantic University Press 
April 160 pp. 81/2X11 Paper $24.95
Amphibians and Reptiles 
of the West Indies
Descriptions, Distributions, & Natural History
Albert Schwartz and Robert W. Henderson 
“A definitive synopsis of West Indian herpetofauna. ”
—George R. Zug, National Museum of Natural History, 
Smithsonian Institution
University of Florida Press 
May 740 pp. 7X10 Cloth $75.00
New from University Presses of Florida
U.S. Policy in Central America 
The Endless Debate
Dario Moreno
“An excellent analysis of the evolution of U.S. Central 
American policies under the Carter and Reagan admin­
istrations that exposes the roles played by competing 
strategic visions and bureaucratic interest groups in shap­
ing two of the most dramatic failures in recent U.S. for­
eign policy.”—Andrew A. Reding, World Policy Institute 
Florida International University Press 
Cloth $26.95 Paper $14.95
Central America and the Middle East 
The Internationalization of the Crises 
Edited by Damidn J. Femdndez
“This valuable contribution addresses a neglected dimen­
sion of the current crisis and goes far to explain why 
Central American conflict has been so hard to resolve.”
—G. Pope Atkins, U.S. Naval Academy
Florida International University Press 
Cloth $26.95 Paper $15.95
&  V A R D A S
a
No*rr
The Libro de las profecias 
of Christopher Columbus 
An en face editon
Translation and commentary by 
Delno C. West and August Kling
“Perhaps the most important 
single volume on Columbus ever 
published in English.. . .  The 
authors’ classification of Columbus’s 
piety as ‘evangelical’ will be contro­
versial, but is exactly right. He was as 
cosmopolitan in his piety as in his 
cosmography.”—Leonard Sweet, 
president, Union Theological Seminary 
University of Florida Press 
May 288 pp. 8 1/2 x 11 Cloth $49.95
Through your local full-service bookseller, or direct from: 
University Presses of Florida, 15 N.W. 15th St., Gainesville, 
Florida 32611. 904-392-1351. Include $3.00 (UPS) or $2.00 
(bookpost) shipping for the first book, $.50 for each additional 
book. Florida residents add 6% sales tax to book price.
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The Israeli-Colombian Connection
by Allan Metz
T he story of retired Israeli military figures training Colombian drug couriers and coordinating weap­ons sales reads like a spy thriller complete with 
exotic locadons in the Caribbean 
and Central America. Drug cartels, 
weapons, killings, and a complex 
trail of money traced through 
Latin American and US bank ac­
counts are all part of the sordid ac­
tivities of retired colonel Yair Klein 
and his Hod Hahanit (“Spearhead 
Ltd.”) security company. A major 
story in the Israeli media since ac­
cusations were first raised in 1989, 
revelations of Spearhead’s activities 
in training Colombian drug para­
military forces were followed by 
charges that the colonel also coor­
dinated arms sales between Israel 
and the notorious Medellin drug 
cartel. As a screen for these activ­
ities, Klein used sales to the Carib­
bean nation of Antigua.
These accusations were exam­
ined in detail by Senator William 
Roth’s (R-DE) Investigations Sub­
committee based on testimony, 
bank records, and other docu­
mentation. The subcommittee 
concluded that the Klein case is a 
classic illustration of the worldwide 
arms trade and its criminal connec­
tions.
Transnational Web
The subcommittee investigation 
provided further clarification of 
the secretive money trail and con-
Allan Metz is assistant professor and 
assistant subject specialist for Latin 
America at the University Library of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Cham- 
paign.
clusively dispelled Klein’s claims 
that he had no involvement in 
arms trading and that the Antiguan 
government paid for them. The 
Senate hearings disclosed that 
Klein paid the Israeli Military Indus­
tries (IMI), a branch of the foreign 
ministry, for the arms via a com­
plex series of financial transactions 
whose source was the “Spearhead 
Ltd.” account in a Panamanian
The nexus involves 
drug cartels, weapons, 
killings, and a 
complex international 
trail of money.
bank. Since the Panamanian gov­
ernment did not cooperate with 
the Senate investigation, the issue 
of whether the money in Klein’s ac­
count in Panama was deposited 
there by Colombian drug figures is 
still unresolved. Nonetheless, the 
Senate report concluded, “in spite 
of our lack of access to relevant for­
eign bank records .. . ,  the money 
for the Antiguan weapons ship­
m ent probably came from the 
same source where the weapons 
eventually ended up—Rodriguez 
Gacha of the Medellin cartel.” 
Besides the Panamanian bank 
account, another connection to 
Panama was made in the Senate 
report. On February 13,1989, 
$100,000 was paid into the Bank 
Hapoalim account of IMI’s Miami 
representative—Brigadier General
Pinchas Shahar—by Colonel 
Eduardo Herrera Hassan, a Pana­
manian leader who at that time was 
involved in the movement to oust 
then strongman General Manuel 
Noriega. It is generally known that 
a paramilitary school Klein and 
Maurice Sarfati—an Israeli citizen 
resident in Antigua since 1983— 
had intended to establish in Anti­
gua was to have been involved in 
training forces to overthrow 
Noriega.
By early 1989 it had already 
been established that Klein had 
trained drug gangs in Colombia 
and he eventually went to trial in Is­
rael. According to Klein’s attorney 
Yigal Shapira: “It’s not as if he com­
mitted a murder or anything . . . .  
This is like a contractor who builds 
without a license. We are talking 
about a two to five-month sus­
pended sentence.” At the sentenc­
ing hearing on January 3, 1991, 
however, the judge thought other­
wise. Klein received a one-year 
suspended sentence, three years 
probation, and a fine of $75,000 
from the Jerusalem Magistrates 
Court for the export of military ex­
pertise without proper licensing. In 
her decision, Judge Miriam Bern­
stein also noted the great harm 
done by Klein to Israel’s reputation 
and the conduct of its foreign rela­
tions.
Colombian officials took a much 
dimmer view of Klein’s activities. 
They linked Klein and Spearhead 
to the training of the cartel’s para­
military to perform assassinations, 
massacres, bombings, and other 
acts of terrorism. They claim 
Klein’s training contributed to 
the assassination of Colombian 
presidential candidate Luis Carlos 
Galan on August 18, 1989, and the 
bombing of a commercial airliner
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in November 1989, which killed 
117 people. General Miguel Maza 
Marquez, director of the Departa- 
mento Administrative de Seguridad (a 
Colombian equivalent to the FBI), 
charged in a February 1990 press 
conference that Klein was “the per­
son who has done the most dam­
age to Colombia . . . (and) who 
trained these people in the making 
of bombs and is responsible for 
this aggression.” Almost a year 
later, Colombian foreign minister 
Luis Fernando Jaramillo Correa 
protested Klein’s lenient sentence: 
“We are seeing how the judicial sys­
tems of other countries are quite 
tolerant of actions which flagrantly
Corruption in Colombia
A recent UN study demonstrated that, taken on a worldwide basis, the 
costs of corruption committed by public employees was ten times 
greater than the costs of illegal acts committed by common criminals.
The case is certainly proven in Colombia. In fact, in Colombia the 
problem is so huge that no one knows what to do about i t  The most re­
cent study on criminality in Colombia indicates that, while all crimes 
were growing at an annual rate of 39.7%, those described as committed 
by public employees were growing by 164.1%. Despite this skyrocketing 
rate, there are few convictions. The one thing everyone agrees with, 
therefore, is that something has to be done, and the sooner the better. 
The rate of administrative corruption has reached such heights that cov­
erage on corruption takes up more space in the local press than cover­
age on terrorism.
During the first eight days in March 1991, public opinion was ex­
posed to what seemed like an inexhaustible list of crimes and irregulari­
ties committed by Colombian administrators. The public attorney’s 
office was investigating 29 parliamentarians and 1,261 customs officials 
for possible unlawful enrichment, and indicated it had also sanctioned 
507 members of the armed forces. The reality is that our court system, 
our various comptrollers, state prosecutors, and other fiscal agencies 
cannot handle the magnitude of complaints and accusations. Between 
1988 and 1990 the Administration de Impuestos Nacionales fired 102 and 
suspended another 151 employees. In the Institute de Seguras Sociales the 
number of firings and suspensions already reached 40 during the first 
two months of 1991. The nation’s attorney general, which is normally 
capable of handling 15,000 disciplinary cases per year, is currently han­
dling 49,155 disciplinary processes. In the municipality of Bogota, 2,000 
employees are being investigated. Without doubt, the administrative 
crime of choice today is illicit enrichment. It is on this charge that 29 
parliamentarians, 48 judges and magistrates, 65 directors of public 
municipal corporations, 68 directors of decentralized institutes, 72 
members of the armed forces, 88 members of the national police, 92 
popularly elected mayors, and 149 employees of the Direction General de 
Aduanas are being investigated by the special investigations unit of the 
attorney general’s office.
Corruption is a disease to which the country appears to have become 
accustomed. There is even talk now of an entrenched bureaucratic- 
administrative “cartel.” Everyone agrees that an anticorruption drive 
can no longer be deferred. Only a month ago [February 1991], ex­
president Carlos Lleras Restrepo, in an editorial in Nueva Frontera 
entitled “The Thieves,” lambasted the multiple acts of theft and de­
linquency of duties. He described several cases representing losses to 
the treasury of more than 3 billion pesos. These included the falsifica­
tion of titles of ownership in the Salinas housing project, the disappear­
ance of ownership certificates from the Caja de Vivienda Militar, the 
stealing of jewels and money on deposit in the Banco Popular of Santa 
Marta, and the falsification of identity certificates of the Banco Central
Continued on page 27
Editor’s Note: Edited version of an editorial appearing in Semana (Bogota), 
March 12, 1991.
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trail of money traced through 
Latin American and US bank ac­
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and his Hod Hahanit (“Spearhead 
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revelations of Spearhead’s activities 
in training Colombian drug para­
military forces were followed by 
charges that the colonel also coor­
dinated arms sales between Israel 
and the notorious Medellin drug 
cartel. As a screen for these activ­
ities, Klein used sales to the Carib­
bean nation of Antigua.
These accusations were exam­
ined in detail by Senator William 
Roth’s (R-DE) Investigations Sub­
committee based on testimony, 
bank records, and other docu­
mentation. The subcommittee 
concluded that the Klein case is a 
classic illustration of the worldwide 
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Senate hearings disclosed that 
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tries (IMI), a branch of the foreign 
ministry, for the arms via a com­
plex series of financial transactions 
whose source was the “Spearhead 
Ltd.” account in a Panamanian
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bank. Since the Panamanian gov­
ernment did not cooperate with 
the Senate investigation, the issue 
of whether the money in Klein’s ac­
count in Panama was deposited 
there by Colombian drug figures is 
still unresolved. Nonetheless, the 
Senate report concluded, “in spite 
of our lack of access to relevant for­
eign bank records . . . ,  the money 
for the Antiguan weapons ship­
ment probably came from the 
same source where the weapons 
eventually ended up—Rodriguez 
Gacha of the Medellin cartel.” 
Besides the Panamanian bank 
account, another connection to 
Panama was made in the Senate 
report. On February 13,1989, 
$100,000 was paid into the Bank 
Hapoalim account of IMI’s Miami 
representative—Brigadier General
Pinchas Shahar—by Colonel 
Eduardo Herrera Hassan, a Pana­
manian leader who at that time was 
involved in the movement to oust 
then strongman General Manuel 
Noriega. It is generally known that 
a paramilitary school Klein and 
Maurice Sarfati—an Israeli citizen 
resident in Antigua since 1983—
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in November 1989, which killed 
117 people. General Miguel Maza 
Marquez, director of the Departa- 
mento Administrativo de Seguridad (a 
Colombian equivalent to the FBI), 
charged in a February 1990 press 
conference that Klein was “the per­
son who has done the most dam­
age to Colombia .. . (and) who 
trained these people in the making 
of bombs and is responsible for 
this aggression.” Almost a year 
later, Colombian foreign minister 
Luis Fernando Jaramillo Correa 
protested Klein’s lenient sentence: 
“We are seeing how the judicial sys­
tems of other countries are quite 
tolerant of actions which flagrantly 
violate international law and even 
the laws in those countries . . . .  In 
any case, it is once again disap­
pointing to see how justice oper­
ates in the rest of the world.”
Even prior to this sentencing 
hearing in early 1991, however, 
most observers believed the Klein 
trial had come too late, and proved 
insufficient to soothe Colombia’s 
intense anger at Israel’s indirect 
role in narcoparamilitary outrages. 
For example, on June 9,1989, then 
Colombian president Virgilio 
Barco Vargas made paramilitary 
training (which is what Klein had 
been involved in) a criminal of­
fense punishable by prison terms 
of up to 20 years. Another blow to 
Israeli-Colombian relations was 
NBC news broadcast on August 22,
1989, of a Spearhead promotional 
videotape showing Klein training 
Colombian drug militias. The 
video was then repeated on the 
other major networks, creating a 
linkage in the public mind be­
tween Israel and the drug cartels. 
The publicity surrounding the 
broadcast thus proved to be a great 
embarrassment for Israel—a coun­
try that takes pride in portraying 
itself as a leader in the struggle 
against terrorism.
As for Klein, he was only too 
willing to cast aspersions on the 
Colombian government. On Au­
gust 25,1989, he declared: “I esti­
mate that there is no organization 
in Colombia that is not linked to
Corruption in Colombia
A recent UN study demonstrated that, taken on a worldwide basis, the 
costs of corruption committed by public employees was ten times 
greater than the costs of illegal acts committed by common criminals.
The case is certainly proven in Colombia. In fact, in Colombia the 
problem is so huge that no one knows what to do about i t  The most re­
cent study on criminality in Colombia indicates that, while all crimes 
were growing at an annual rate of 39.7%, those described as committed 
by public employees were growing by 164.1%. Despite this skyrocketing 
rate, there are few convictions. The one thing everyone agrees with, 
therefore, is that something has to be done, and the sooner the better. 
The rate of administrative corruption has reached such heights that cov­
erage on corruption takes up more space in the local press than cover­
age on terrorism.
During the first eight days in March 1991, public opinion was ex­
posed to what seemed like an inexhaustible list of crimes and irregulari­
ties committed by Colombian administrators. The public attorney’s 
office was investigating 29 parliamentarians and 1,261 customs officials 
for possible unlawful enrichment, and indicated it had also sanctioned 
507 members of the armed forces. The reality is that our court system, 
our various comptrollers, state prosecutors, and other fiscal agencies 
cannot handle the magnitude of complaints and accusations. Between 
1988 and 1990 the Administration de Impuestos Nationales fired 102 and 
suspended another 151 employees. In the Instituto de Seguros Sociaks the 
number of firings and suspensions already reached 40 during the first 
two months of 1991. The nation’s attorney general, which is normally 
capable of handling 15,000 disciplinary cases per year, is currently han­
dling 49,155 disciplinary processes. In the municipality of Bogota, 2,000 
employees are being investigated. Without doubt, the administrative 
crime of choice today is illicit enrichment. It is on this charge that 29 
parliamentarians, 48 judges and magistrates, 65 directors of public 
municipal corporations, 68 directors of decentralized institutes, 72 
members of the armed forces, 88 members of the national police, 92 
popularly elected mayors, and 149 employees of the Direction General de 
Aduanasare being investigated by the special investigations unit of the 
attorney general’s office.
Corruption is a disease to which the country appears to have become 
accustomed. There is even talk now of an entrenched bureaucratic- 
administrative “cartel.” Everyone agrees that an anticorruption drive 
can no longer be deferred. Only a month ago [February 1991], ex­
president Carlos Lleras Restrepo, in an editorial in Nueva Frontera 
entitled “The Thieves,” lambasted the multiple acts of theft and de­
linquency of duties. He described several cases representing losses to 
the treasury of more than 3 billion pesos. These included the falsifica­
tion of titles of ownership in the Salinas housing project, the disappear­
ance of ownership certificates from the Caja de Vivienda Militar, the 
stealing of jewels and money on deposit in the Banco Popular of Santa 
Marta, and the falsification of identity certificates of the Banco Central
Continued on page 27
Editor’s Note: Edited version of an editorial appearing in Semana (Bogota), 
March 12, 1991.
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drugs, from the government down­
wards.”
In a later development, on 
March 25,1991, the Jerusalem 
District Court rejected a libel suit 
filed by Klein against Ron Ben- 
Yishai, a reporter for the Tel Aviv 
newspaper Yediot Aharonot. Ben- 
Yishai reported that Klein and his 
colleagues, four of whom are co­
plaintiffs, had been “security in­
structors” for the Medellin cartel. 
The judge determined that Ben- 
Yishai had written in good faith 
and that his article was in the pub­
lic interest. She also ruled favorably 
in the reporter’s countersuit by 
awarding him a small amount in 
damages.
The US Senate subcommittee 
provided additional facts on the Is­
raeli connection. It noted that 
Klein and his associates worked 
with paramilitary groups led by 
Rodriguez Gacha and the Medellin 
cartel. They described Israeli mer­
cenary activities in Colombia as “a 
sordid tale of greed and intrigue” 
and related how Klein’s firm gave 
three training courses that in­
cluded basic infantry and weaponry 
instruction, defensive and body­
guard techniques, and explosives 
detection. The Senate report fur­
ther stated that: “Israeli embassy 
personnel knew Yair Klein was oper­
ating in Colombia, but no action 
was taken against him until after re­
ports of his activities surfaced in 
the media . . . .  Hopefully, Klein’s 
subsequent criminal prosecution 
and conviction under Israeli law in­
dicate that the Israeli government 
intends to monitor such activities 
more closely in the future.”
This conclusion was also 
reached in the final report of the 
one-man Commission of Inquiry 
for Antigua and Barbuda. The au­
thor, British Queen Counsel, Louis 
Blom-Cooper, described the affair 
as a “wicked enterprise.” While he 
did not believe the Israeli govern­
ment had any knowledge the weap­
ons were destined for Colombia, 
he did find that Israel had been 
negligent in its failure to exercise 
control over the IMI. The report
listed a number of aspects of the 
transaction for the sale and pur­
chase of the guns and ammunition 
“. . .  which showed a lack of care.”
Although the focus of his in­
quiry was Antigua, Blom-Cooper 
did make some comments and rec­
ommendations regarding Israel.
He suggested further investigation 
into and monitoring of Israeli 
citizens’ actions abroad and also 
the establishment of a UN registry 
of end-user certificates. These pro­
posals seem not only reasonable 
but necessary. There is a grey area 
involving the activities of these re­
tired military officials as private citi­
zens and their activities on behalf 
of government or industry. Many 
are employed in Israel’s profitable 
arms export sector as dealers, train­
ers, and technical advisors to a 
number of Third World countries 
that seek Israel’s technology and 
expertise.
For example, one of the key fig­
ures in the case, Brigadier General 
Pinchas Shahar, who served as a 
link between the IMI and Klein 
and his Spearhead, is currently in 
Israel. There he is employed by the 
Elul arms company, owned by 
Koor, the holding company of the 
Israeli labor federation. The Klein- 
Spearhead affair was not a total ab­
erration; Klein and Shahar fit the 
common profile of the activist 
retired officer.
Have Guns, Will Travel
Klein describes himself as “an ex­
pert in war against terrorists and an 
expert in war against guerrillas . . . .  
I am brave and a little adventur­
ous.” With “ice-blue” eyes and 
closely cut hair, Klein fits the 
image of an Israeli military hero.
He was born on a kibbutz, where 
many war heroes came from. Im­
mediately following completion of 
technical school, Klein joined Com­
pany 890, the country’s first elite 
paratroop unit. He led helicopter 
troops and “secret ‘antiterrorist’ op­
erations.” He fought in the 1967 
Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War, and following retire­
ment in 1979 he started a restau­
rant and operated a service station. 
These pursuits proved to be too 
tame for Klein’s restless spirit. He 
observed that “Some people like to 
knit. I like to help people defend 
themselves. I go in where the gov­
ernment can’t go, where it can’t 
allow its name to be used.” Klein’s 
Spearhead company sold clothes 
and hardware in the early 1980s to 
Beirut-based Christian Falangist 
militias and to the South Lebanon 
Army, a militia with ties to Israel 
located along the border between 
Israel and Lebanon. He later ex­
tended his operations to Latin 
America, including Guatemala 
and Colombia.
One can understand, therefore, 
the critical and timely nature of 
Blom-Cooper’s point concerning 
the role of former Israeli military 
figures who are involved in selling 
weapons and military expertise to 
the highest bidder. This issue con­
stitutes a national debate in Israel. 
In addition it raises questions 
about the Defense Ministry’s re­
sponsibility to control the export of 
Israeli weaponry and military exper­
tise, and how former Israeli mili­
tary personnel like Klein became 
involved in such illegal activities. Is­
rael has had a long-standing inter­
est in selling its surplus military 
hardware to the Third World. 
Israel’s two major parties, Likud 
and Labor, have long opposed the 
passage of laws that would allow 
the Knesset to control the sale of 
military exports and prohibit sales 
to certain nations. Israeli middle­
men such as Klein have been suc­
cessful in manipulating Israel’s 
desire to maximize military ex­
ports—the main reason for Israel’s 
indiscriminate weapons sales pol­
icy—to suit their own enterprises.
The government claims its arms 
trade is essential to support the 
country’s strategic internal needs 
for manufacturing and developing 
arms. In the mid-1980s the arms 
trade accounted for some 25% of 
Israel’s industrial exports.
Latin America became a signif­
icant Israeli market for war mate-
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riel when the US terminated or re­
duced military sales to several gov­
ernments accused of committing 
human rights violations. Official Is­
raeli military sales to the Colom­
bian government amount to 
hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Since 1986 the Israeli government 
has mandated that firms providing 
overseas military or security train­
ing apply for a license from the 
Defense Ministry for each project. 
This action was taken after the Iran- 
contra affair revealed that Israeli 
arms traders were involved in Oli­
ver North’s plan to sell weapons to 
Iran in order to raise funds for the 
contra war against the Sandinistas. 
According to the Defense Ministry, 
800 Israelis and Israeli companies 
have received licenses to export 
weapons and technology. Israeli se­
curity officials admit, however, that 
it is much harder to monitor the ex­
port of ex-military m en’s expertise 
than to control weapons exports. 
For example, Israeli trainers have 
been linked to government repres­
sion of guerrillas in Guatemala and 
to security protection for the for­
mer Panamanian dictator General 
Manuel Noriega. Israel also had 
ties with Nicaraguan dictator 
Anastasio Somoza until his over­
throw in 1979. This dubious record 
prompted the independent Israeli 
newspaper Hadashot to wonder in 
an editorial: “What are our boys 
doing in Colombia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, El 
Salvador, Costa Rica, and not just 
those places?”
New Twist
But the Klein-Spearhead case 
marks a departure from past ac­
tivities. It is the first time Israelis 
have been charged with training 
narcotics armies. According to the 
Tel Aviv daily Yediot Aharanot, Is­
raeli involvement with the drug mi­
litias is of great concern to Israeli 
government officials: “This time 
the issue is not aid to guerrilla 
groups, rebels or even fascistic 
government(s), as was customary 
until now. Now it is Israeli merce-
Continued from page 25
Hipotecario. ‘T he national treasury,” he concluded, “has been a victim of 
thieves who deserve to be punished. Thieves and what thieves . . .  never 
before has so much been stolen. Crime but also official indifference. 
Poor country!”
Experts identify the costs of corruption under four broad con­
sequences. First, corruption destroys the efficiency of the state by 
squandering its resources and debilitating its actions against misman­
agement. Such corruption can even lead to threats to the public health: 
for instance, shoddy construction, use of dated or tainted medicines, or 
the redirection of basic food stuffs from children’s hostels to other 
uses—all known to have occurred recently in Colombia.
Second, corruption engenders an absurd distortion in the distribu­
tion of income by making the rich richer and the poor poorer. The 
poor get poorer, for instance, when public projects for the more disad­
vantaged parts of the population are either not completed or are com­
pleted at substandard levels because of corruption.
Third, the incentives of corruption are contrary to the development 
of the society: they spawn the insidious idea that it is easier to get rich 
by working for the state than by starting a private and productive busi­
ness. This idea militates against the creation of new jobs. Half of the 
administrative positions of a certain rank are occupied by people nomi­
nated by political bosses, not by career bureaucrats.
Fourth, corruption incurs serious political costs: immorality, cyni­
cism, institutional instability, and the legitimization of armed rebellion 
against the state. Colombia’s most serious problem is the political sys­
tem’s lack of legitimacy among the masses. This problem stems from 
the widespread corruption, and it is illusory to think that constitutional 
reform will solve it.
How can we confront a problem of such magnitude? The first step 
requires the political will to put an end to the scourge, or at least to re­
duce it to manageable proportions. The will was shown when the presi­
dency created the Consejeria de Moralizadon Administrative., even though 
there already are voices opposing it. An analogous system was used with 
complete success in Hong Kong, formerly one of the most corrupt 
spots on earth. There a commission of five people of impeccable cre­
dentials, invested with full powers to penetrate banking secrecy, tap 
telephones, intercept the mails, and trail suspects was successful. In 
Colombia the Consejeria ought to be supported by the most modem  in­
vestigatory technology, among these prosecutors with full powers, ac­
countants, computer-assisted audits, electronic surveillance of financial 
transfers, and communications of various types.
But the crusade against corruption goes even further: the comptrol­
ler general has contracted FedesarroUo to do the first study ever on the 
state of corruption in Colombia. To be completed by the end of 1991, it 
represents an attempt to diminish the trend of social decomposition.
Given the opening and internationalizing of Colombia’s economy, 
corruption is a graver obstacle than is the inefficiency of the ports or 
the absence of railroads. In the final analysis, the discrediting of the gov­
erning classes is the most serious consequence of the high level of de­
moralization. ■
(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
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naries who served in elite units and 
have agreed to serve the drug car­
tels for hundreds of thousands of 
dollars per person.” Motti Amichai, 
an Israeli foreign ministry spokes­
man, declared that Klein’s actions 
violated Israeli law and ran counter 
to Israeli policy, which is “strongly 
committed to the war on drugs.” 
Israel has tough antidrug laws, 
and drugs are a cultural taboo. It 
is ironic, then, that allegations of 
Israeli involvement with drug traf­
fickers coincide with Israel’s con­
siderable increase in drug abuse. 
Colombian intelligence officials, 
however, have expressed skepti­
cism over the Israeli government’s 
denials of knowledge about Klein’s 
activities. According to an anony­
mous senior official: “The Israeli 
government would have to be very
foolish or very naive not to have 
known what was going on . . . .  And 
the Israelis are neither. But the 
truth is, as this shows, they will sell 
anything to anyone if the price is 
right.”
Meanwhile, in Israel, the Klein- 
Spearhead incident received a 
mixed response among public of­
ficials. To Justice Minister Dan 
Meridor it represented a “serious 
injury to Israel’s image, to the 
image of the [Israel Defense 
Forces]. It is important that it re­
mains positive, of a patriotic army 
conducting a righteous war in a 
moral way.” Foreign Minister 
Moshe Arens demonstrated similar 
indignation when he promised the 
government would “do everything 
in our power to enforce the law 
and prevent all aid by Israelis to
the drug cartel.” According to Meir 
Amit, former director of Mossad, 
Israel’s equivalent to the CIA: ‘The 
greatest damage is that, rather 
than being known as producers in 
agriculture, in genetics, in medi­
cine, our trademark is now in the 
security business, whether it be 
weapons or support systems.”
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, on 
the other hand, was not as categori­
cal: “It’s unpleasant to hear about 
Israelis involved in such ugly busi­
ness, but there are Israelis all over 
the world doing things the state 
cannot be held responsible for.”
He was also quoted as saying: “I 
don’t know if all the information, 
allegations, incriminations are 
true. I know our people. I know 
our officers. I cannot believe that 
they have been involved in such 
crimes . . . . ”
Ariel Sharon, who tends toward 
military solutions to most of Israel’s 
problems, was even more equivo­
cal. “Klein and his associates,” he 
stated, “have already been judged. 
It’s simply unbelievable. With our 
own hands we are making Israel re­
sponsible for the subject of drugs 
in Colombia.” In reaction to 
Sharon’s defense of Klein, Yossi 
Sarid, a leftist Knesset member of 
the Citizens’ Rights Party and a 
msyor figure in the Israeli peace 
movement, was adamant: “A bluff­
er like Klein needs a lot of defend­
ing because his version of events 
concerning banana growers is itself 
a banana version—here and there 
soft, here and there rotten.”
Klein’s defense can be seen as 
disingenuous or cynical and per­
haps even both. Even the benefit of 
hindsight, he says, may not have 
been sufficient to guarantee that 
his training was not utilized for 
criminal purposes. And if some­
thing did go awry, he protests it 
was because he was “an innocent 
abroad.” He asks rhetorically: “Do 
you know any genuine fighters who 
are not naive? Yes, there was naive­
te in this.” And then, the ultimate 
attempt at personal vindication:
“.. . it’s also naive to think there is 
justice in the world.” ■
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Calypso Politics
by Daisann McLane
The rhythms of music and politics are tightly synchronized in Caribbean societies 
such as Trinidad, as reflected in the calypso diplomacy of Abu Bakr’s failed coup 
and its aftermath
W hen the rebel leader Yasin Abu Bakr and his followers cap­tured Trinidad and Tobago’s House of Parliament and 
broadcasting studios in an at­
tempted coup in July 1990, one 
of the first things they did—after 
taking the prime minister and his 
cabinet hostage—was turn Trini­
dad’s television station into calypso 
MTV. Until the authorities jammed 
their broadcasts, the rebel group 
Jamaat al Muslimeen ran continu­
ous videos of politically aware ca­
lypso singers like David Rudder, 
Watchman, and Cro Cro in be­
tween Abu Bakr’s running com­
mentary. Abu Bakr’s stint as 
revolutionary video host demon­
strated what Trinidadians have 
long known: calypso (and soca, the 
modern multitrack studio version 
of this traditional music) is as im­
portant as politics in this lively, 
noisy, multiethnic Caribbean de­
mocracy.
Calypso Messages
Since Trinidad’s independence 
from Britain in 1962, the messages 
of calypso have influenced the 
speeches of prime ministers and 
the decisions of judges, and calypso
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records have helped parties win— 
and lose—elections. In using the 
music as a political tool, Abu Bakr 
was following a time-tested Trini­
dad formula (in fact, one of his 
advisers was a former calypso pro­
moter) .
Despite his “calypso diplomacy,” 
Abu Bakr’s revolution failed to at­
tract popular support, and the at­
tempted coup resulted in dozens of 
deaths, a wave of looting that de­
stroyed several blocks of the capi­
tal, and five months of martial law.
Abu Bakr, who is now in prison, 
may have failed in this purpose, 
but he helped revitalize the na­
tion’s music. This skipping, synco­
pated Caribbean pop has made 
some inroads in the US market, 
but in past years it has sounded as 
spent as the petrodollars that used 
to overflow from Trinidad’s trea­
sury.
Every year calypsonians write 
and record new songs timed to Car­
nival season. But because of the 
coup, releases in 1990-91 have had 
an added resonance: they try to 
make sense of it all by examining 
the economic and social issues that 
provoked the unrest. The songs of 
Carnival 1991 were equal parts psy­
chic housecleaning, national ca­
tharsis, and political analysis. 
Indeed, for the non-Trinidadian, 
recent releases by Cro Cro, Watch­
man, Superblue, Black Stalin, and 
David Rudder provide a lively semi­
nar on Caribbean history and cur­
rent events—with a beat.
The biting antigovernment com­
mentary of Cro Cro and Watchman 
often seems crude: both calypsoni­
ans refer in their songs to a re­
ported incident during the July 
1990 siege in which the rebels al­
legedly shoved a female minister’s 
underpants down the prime min­
ister’s throat. But the rough lan­
guage and barbed cynicism of both 
singers reflect post-coup public sen­
timent—a profound anger over
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economic mismanagement and al­
leged corruption in the govern­
m ent of Prime Minister Arthur N. 
R. (Robbie) Robinson. There is 
also a certain sympathy for Abu 
Bakr’s intentions, if not for his 
methods.
Cro Cro, one of the best lyricists 
of Trinidad’s younger generation, 
presents an elegant, well-tooled ar­
gument that captures street-level 
opinion about Abu Bakr. His “Say a 
Prayer for Abu Bakr,” delivered in 
a low-key tenor spiked with irony 
and softened with wit, demon­
strates that the calypso form is one 
of the last repositories of English- 
language rhetoric in the 20th cen­
tury: “In this democratic society/The 
coup was wrong without a doubt/If all 
o’you was so against Robbie/Why de 
hell didn’t you vote him out?/But then 
again i f  you wait til election/Man 
might have had to start eating man/So 
don’t blame Abu Bakr, don’t fuss/Bakr 
did it for all of us.”
The title of Watchman’s top 
song of the 1991 Carnival season, 
“Attack with Full Force,” is lifted 
from a statement issued by Robin­
son to the Trinidad military during 
his imprisonment by the rebels.
But Watchman, a student leader at 
the University of the West Indies, 
turns the tables and takes the 
prime minister’s order as a man­
date to attack the Robinson admin­
istration. Watchman, still in his 20s, 
is the brashest and most critical 
voice in calypso today. (It was his 
video that Abu Bakr played on na­
tional TV in the early hours of the 
coup attempt.) And Watchman 
knows how to use symbolism to 
maximum effect: he performed 
“Attack” wearing the camouflage 
fatigues of the army special forces 
team that captured the rebels.
In Trinidad dissent in music is 
business as usual. During the six- 
week Carnival period, calypsonians 
speak the unspeakable—and politi­
cians put up with it, perhaps be­
cause this ritual serves to diffuse 
discontent that might otherwise 
find more turbulent channels. As 
the calypsonian David Rudder ex­
plains: “Calypso helps keep our so­
ciety on an even keel. The songs be­
come our violent acts. We kill each 
other with song.”
Nevertheless, when it comes 
time for the state-sponsored Ca­
lypso Monarch competition, an 
annual event to select the best ca­
lypso composition, moderation 
rules. For the February 10,1991, 
contest, which was nationally tele­
vised, Cro Cro censored his line 
about the infamous panties. And 
when the ballots were tallied, he 
and Watchman (who kept the un­
derwear in) had been defeated by 
the calypso veteran Black Stalin, 
whose coup composition, “Look on 
the Bright Side,” was a masterpiece 
of ambiguity. The song never ex­
plains whether the “bright side” is a 
return to normalcy or the hoped- 
for electoral defeat of Robinson.
Calypso helps keep 
our society on an even 
keel. The songs become 
our violent acts. We 
kill each other xvith 
song.
Stalin, a Rastafarian in his early 
50s with waist-length dreadlocks 
and a gleeful, insinuating rasp, usu­
ally pitches his commentary to the 
left of center; a three-time Calypso 
Monarch, his is the voice of the 
Trinidadian working class. But this 
year, Stalin threw a curve. His 
other song of the season, “Black 
Man Feel to Party,” bounced and 
“wined”—Trinidad slang for hip ro­
tation—its way up the dance charts 
to become one of the season’s top- 
three party tunes. Trinidad audi­
ences delighted at the sight of the 
politically conscious Stalin ham­
ming it up on stage as a rheumatic, 
middle-aged husband, urging his 
wife to come out and dance “like 
we used to do before the children 
come.”
Less “Jam and Wine”
“Feel to Party,” with its bubbly, scat- 
sung groove, is an example of the 
most important, and lasting, effect 
the coup has had on calypso. Over 
the last four years, the party rec­
ords produced by Trinidad’s calyp­
so stars had come under increased 
fire for their musical predictability 
and repetitious “jam and wine” 
topics. But, after the traumatic 
experience of the coup attempt, 
Trinidadians seem to have lost pa­
tience with empty lyrics.
All the top dance-hall soca rec­
ords of 1991, even the ones not 
specifically political, have had a 
clever twist, a story, or a slangy 
series of puns to tickle the public 
imagination. In Bally’s “Calypso 
Coup,” “back back,” a hip motion, 
becomes “back Bakr.” In David 
Rudder’s love song, “Nuff Re­
spect,” the woman calls the shots— 
highly unusual in the macho 
culture.
As is always the case when major 
events shake Trinidad, there was 
one perfect song: Superblue’s “Get 
Something and Wave.” A tour de 
force of sociopolitical pop, “Wave” 
uses the off-center drumbeat of 
Trinidad’s African-derived Spiri­
tual Baptists and taps into religious 
symbols.
Superblue’s joyful exhortation 
to wave something galvanized a 
country in which flags are a key 
element in the rituals of three im­
portant local religions: Shango, 
Hindu, and Muslim. (Abu Bakr’s 
coup occurred on Hosay, an Is­
lamic holiday usually marked by a 
parade with small flags.) The thou­
sands of fluttering cloths that burst 
out of nowhere every time “Wave” 
was played at Carnival weren’t just 
a fad—the flags represented an 
affirmation of Trinidad’s multi­
ethnic culture and determination 
to bind the wounds of the coup.
Or, as Rudder explains: “Calypso is 
an art form that laughs at pain. 
That’s the way we deal with our 
blues. We begin to heal ourselves 
immediately, through our culture 
and our music.” ■
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Merengue: From Race to Gender
by Deborah Pacini Hernandez
Energetic and brassy, the many varieties of merengue are the Dominican Repub­lic’s most popular dance music. Yet merengue's driv­ing rhythm blasts far be­
yond the dance floor. Imbedded in 
the music’s long and rich history 
are the evolving tensions and reso­
lutions of race, class, and culture in 
the making of Dominican national 
identity.
Merengue dates from the years 
1822-44, when Dominicans strug­
gled to end Haiti’s occupation of 
their territory. The story goes that 
a song ridiculing a wounded flag- 
bearer who deserted the battlefield 
emerged at a spontaneous victory 
celebration, and that merengue's par­
ticular dance step—in which one 
foot drags behind the other—was 
the result of revelers mimicking 
the injured coward’s limping gait.
While colorful and engaging, 
this account likely reflects the de­
sire to portray the Haitian occupi­
ers in unfavorable light, as well as 
Dominican sentiment that denies 
Haitian musical influence. Indeed, 
Dominicans have never quite for­
given Haiti for having made the Do­
minican Republic the only country 
in Latin America to have been sub­
jugated by blacks. Their denial of 
African heritage was solidified 
under the dictatorship of Rafael 
Trujillo (1930-61), whose racist pol­
icies included the 1937 massacre of
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thousands of persons of Haitian 
descent and the prohibition of folk 
traditions with clear African or 
Haitian antecedents. By local stan­
dards the Dominican population is 
73% mulatto, 16% white, and 11% 
black. Nevertheless, the negritude 
movements that surfaced in Carib­
bean countries such as Haiti, Cuba, 
and Jamaica have been notably ab­
sent in the Dominican Republic.
Merengue has evolved 
as contested terrain 
for debate about the 
Dominican Republic’s 
national identity, 
from the issue of 
African roots to the 
empowerment of 
women.
In contrast with the Dominican 
interpretation, Haitian music his­
torians claim that their country’s 
meringue is the precursor of meren­
gue. Others regard Cuba or Puerto 
Rico as the music’s birthplace. In 
any case, the Dominican Republic 
is clearly the site where merengue 
has taken strongest hold.
Merengue was originally rural 
music that enlivened events of all 
sorts, from weddings and saints’ 
day festivals to cockfights and Sun­
day gatherings. In addition, meren­
gue songs were vehicles of social 
commentary for illiterate people. 
Given merengue's roots in vernac­
ular culture, it not surprisingly be­
came a symbol of the Dominican 
Republic’s national identity. Its ac­
ceptance spread into the country’s 
upper classes during the US occu­
pation of the country in 1916-24.
In promoting this acceptance, com­
posers transformed merengue from 
rural folk to urban salon and dance 
music.
The next phase of merengue’s evo­
lution took place during the 31- 
year Trujillo dictatorship. Trujillo 
used reward and threat to coopt 
the music, turning it into a mouth­
piece for his concentraton of pow­
er. In so doing, he orchestrated the 
refashioning of merengue into a sym­
bol of his regime’s power and 
modernity, gaining the music de­
finitive entry into the ballrooms of 
the urban elite. The political cost, 
however, was tremendous. Not only 
did Trujillo tolerate no merengue 
lyric critical of his rule; his im­
mense power forced any musician 
of stature who remained in the 
country to literally sing his praises. 
Among the forgettable song titles 
were “Veneremos a Trujillo” (“Let Us 
Venerate Trujillo”), “Trujilloes 
grande e inmortar (“Trujillo is Great 
and Immortal”), and “Trujilloprotec­
tor de choferes” (‘Trujillo the Protec­
tor of Drivers”) .
Remarkably, after Trujillo’s 
death in 1961 merenguewas not dis­
credited, but instead became a sym­
bol of Dominican society’s new 
openness and progress. Johnny 
Ventura, one of the first and most 
successful of the new breed of 
merengueros, shed the ballroom or- 
questa trappings of the Trujillo era 
in favor of a smaller, more ener­
getic combo style. Influenced in part
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by US rock-and-roll, Ventura’s 
combo introduced glittery costumes, 
fast-paced choreography, and 
spicy, satirical lyrics. By the late 
1970s merengue achieved a success­
ful presence in the international 
music scene.
Meanwhile, merengue became 
contested terrain for debate within 
the Dominican Republic about the 
country’s national identity. This de­
bate came to include intellectual 
currents that sought to forge a new 
socially and politically progressive 
identity, one that would credit Do­
minican musical traditions with 
clear African roots. Recognition of 
African contributions to Domini­
can culture and music was not won 
easily. In response to one declara­
tion of merengue's African origins, 
Luis Senior, a leading merengue 
band leader, wrote an article vehe­
mently stating that “This outland­
ish statement is unpatriotic!”
By the early 1980s merengue dis­
placed salsa as the preferred dance 
music of Latin Americans through­
out the hemisphere. In the eupho­
ria, divisive discussion of merengue’s 
African origins seems to have been 
left behind. Taking its place is a 
signal of profound change in Do­
minican society: the stepping to 
the forefront of women in merengue 
ensembles, such as La Media Na- 
ranja and Las Chicas del Can, not 
just as singers but as instrumental­
ists as well. Trombones, trumpets, 
bass, congas, and synthesizers—for­
merly the exclusive domain of 
men—are increasingly in the 
hands of women. So too are the 
lyrics, which are coming to reflect 
female points of view. As Belkis 
Concepcion with Las Chicas del Can 
sings in “El Gran Poder” (“The 
Great Power”): “Oyemebien, tratala 
bien/Que a diferencia de ayer/Hoy 
existe el gran poder/De la mujer/Hoy 
ella tiene libertad/Para poder defen­
der/Su igualdad, su dignidad/Y el 
gran amor de la mujer’’ (“Listen to me, 
treat her well/Unlike yesterday/Today 
there’s the great power/Of woman/
Today she’s got the freedom/To be able 
to defend/Her equality, her digni- 
ty/And woman’s great love”). m
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Samba World
by Andrea Mantell Seidel
Samba
by Alma Guillermoprieto. New York: 
Knopf, 1990. 244 pp. $19.95.
“ JMR marmalade-thick river
of people swept past;
K  outlandish dancers in
feathers and capes, ball- 
gowns and G-strings, 
f l s  ■ ■  hundreds of drummers; 
thousands of leaping princes sing­
ing at the top of their lungs. In the 
ocean of feathers and banners, 
faces emerged: brown, white, pink, 
tan, olive” (p. 6).
So begins Alma Guillermo- 
prieto’s introduction to the mes­
merizing world of Carnival and 
samba—song, story, music, and 
dance—in Rio de Janeiro. Samba is 
centered around the Mangueira 
samba school. The school, one of 
hundreds scattered throughout the 
favelas—the ramshackle slums on 
the hillsides of Rio—is composed 
of black Brazilians who unite for 
the single purpose of parading to­
gether through the main streets of 
Rio at Carnival time. After many 
months of strenuous and costly 
preparation, each of the favelas 
sends up to 5,000 dancers and 
musicians, elaborately costumed in 
the school’s official colors, to com­
pete in the Carnival parade.
As the narrative unfolds, Guiller­
moprieto portrays the venerable
Andrea Mantell Seidel holds a joint 
position as assistant professor in the 
Department of Theater and Dance at 
Florida International University and in 
the New World School of the Arts Dance 
Division, Miami. She recently directed 
and performed in the Eleanor King Me­
morial Dance Program at the Lincoln 
Center Library of Performing Arts, in 
New York City.
and popular Mangueira samba 
school as much more than a mere 
gathering of individuals; it be­
comes a metaphor for joy, pride, 
and hope amid the violence, drugs, 
poverty, and racism that pervade 
existence in the favelas. Poised at 
the heart of community life, the 
schools serve, in part, to reconnect 
the blacks of the favela to their Afri­
can “roots,” to the candomblegods 
whose origin lies in West Africa’s 
Yoruba religion, and to a buried 
Brazilian past nearly obliterated by 
the dominant white government 
and the Catholic Church.
Poised at the heart of 
community life, the 
samba schools 
reconnect the blacks of 
the favela to their 
African roots and 
Brazilian past.
With sensitivity and passion, 
Guillermoprieto traces the com­
plex history and culture of samba 
from its turn-of-the-century roots in 
Brazilian slave culture to the extrav­
agant, commercialized displays of 
contemporary Carnival—which is 
now a vital part of mainstream Bra­
zilian society. The beat of samba, 
felt in its pulsing 2/ 4  time and 
in its sensuous, hypnotic dance 
rhythms, defines the rhythms of 
social life and organization in the
favelas. Story, song, and dance sam­
ba serve as the primary repositories 
of historical identity in an Afro- 
American culture that lacks its 
own written history.
The beat of samba is also power­
fully expressed in Guillermoprie- 
to’s rhythmic, potent language. 
Born in Mexico, trained as a 
dancer, and a journalist by profes­
sion, Guillermoprieto writes with a 
journalist’s eye for detail and im­
mediacy tempered with a dancer’s 
sense of rhythm and kinetic power. 
Through her vivid portraits and 
lush, poetic narratives, the intimate 
fabric of community life is re­
vealed; first the months, then the 
weeks, the days, and at last, the ten­
sions and passions of the final 
hours of Carnival unfold.
“A beautiful black youth with a 
blank face and a body like a snake 
weaves through the early-morning 
drinkers with a friend. The friend, 
an ostrich-like bird with sparkling 
midnight-blue plumage, emerges 
from the back of the minute, flesh- 
colored bikini the youth is wearing 
and rears it’s richly feathered neck 
along the boy’s supple spine . . . .  
The floats tower like magical king­
doms in the glorious morning that 
is breaking, and a mute, awed 
crowd stands around them, still for 
once, just staring” (p. 209).
Carnival Societies
At the time of Guillermoprieto’s 
writing, the Mangueira samba 
school had captured the grand Car­
nival prize two years in a row. She 
records the school’s quest for a 
“triple crown” during the year she 
lived in Rio and participated in the 
Carnival preparations. The Man­
gueira school prided itself, not in 
the elaborateness of their costumes
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as did the higher class white soci­
ety, but in the sense of cultural 
grounding, or “root,” it endeav­
ored to keep alive. Dona Neuma, 
one of the influential matriarchs of 
the school’s directorate, proudly 
proclaims that “it’s not our cos­
tumes that win .. . the crowd goes 
crazy for us because we have root 
and we have spirit. And the soul of 
that is the baianas.” The candomble 
temples of Rio de Janeiro were orig­
inally set up by baianas (“Aunts of 
Bahia”) , freed women slaves who 
brought the cult with them when 
they emigrated from Bahia. To this 
day, all samba schools have a con­
tingent of “baianas” in honor of 
these women.
With the dawn of the 20th 
century, an emerging class of black 
artisans, skilled laborers, and pro­
fessionals aspired to transcend 
their African roots. As a result, they 
began to adopt the latest European 
fashions and behaviors. Instead of 
chanting and drumming, black Car­
nival took on a new “civilized” air. 
The advent of Brazilian radio in 
1923 and its broadcasts of samba 
music heralded the “Samba Era” in 
mainstream white society, and the 
black music and dance of Brazil ac­
quired a national following.
The author recounts how the 
schools represent “carnival socie­
ties,” hierarchies of class and color 
now institutionalized in the Carni­
val parade. The most prestigious 
are the stars of the parade, white 
men and women, who ride high on 
the grandest floats in glittering, be- 
jeweled costumes. Below them are 
the floats with nearly nude danc­
ing women—whites, light-skinned 
black women, or mulattos. The 
poverty-stricken majority—dark- 
skinned favelados, both male and fe­
male—must parade on the road as
the cost of the floats are prohibi­
tive to them.
In subsequent chapters, Gui­
llermoprieto leads us through a 
magical, paradoxical world: one of 
decadent splendor and poignant 
exuberance. Although this world is 
observed and vividly recorded, she 
fails to delve beneath the surface of
The advent of 
Brazilian radio in the 
1920s heralded the 
“Samba Era”in 
mainstream white 
society, and black 
music and dance 
acquired a national 
folloiving.
events and explore the nature and 
meaning of these paradoxes in the 
world that transcends the isolated 
confines of the favela. Herein lies 
the book’s greatest weakness. On 
the one hand, as a dancer, I ad­
mire her ability to capture the soul 
of the samba with freshness and di­
rectness, unencumbered by the 
weight of analysis and interpreta­
tion. On the other, as a dance eth­
nologist, I was often frustrated by 
her failure to penetrate to the 
heart of its meaning. Ana, an at­
tractive, but impoverished bamba, a 
woman wise in the ways of the 
samba world, advised Guillermo­
prieto to “forget about the notetak-
ing” and “to stop trying to write 
down what happens”: “If you don’t 
give in to the spirit of carnival, if 
you don’t let it overwhelm you, 
you’ll never understand what it’s 
like, so how will you be able to ex­
plain it to others? If you have the 
experience, you won’t forget a min­
ute of it” (p. 195).
In this moment, we are con­
fronted by the dilemma faced by all 
those who seek to understand a cul­
ture different from their own. Un­
doubtedly, deep understanding 
involves a process of “letting go”: 
an immersion of the self in the rich 
wholeness of the experience. Never­
theless, samba and Carnival, like 
other masquerades and festivals 
worldwide, are complex cultural 
and symbolic events. They demand 
a degree of analysis, reflexivity, and 
interpretation to understand and 
communicate them effectively to 
others.
Shock and Laughter
Although Samba is rich with histori­
cal reference, its descriptive, non- 
analytical style leaves too many 
questions unanswered to make it 
the definitive study that it could be. 
For example, we learn that “only 
women dance in the central space 
while men dance along the edges 
of the road and that the real 
bambas dance in all-male groups”
(p. 18). We do not learn, however, 
what these facts reveal about social 
relations between men and wom­
en. Moreover, we do not learn how 
this event relates to similar occur­
rences in other festivals and mas­
querades throughout the world.
Sexual ambivalence, ubiquitous 
throughout Carnival in the blatant 
transvestism and in the pervasive 
cross-gender dressing, is discussed
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but not explored as a critical issue: 
“Like the devotees of Ishtar, the 
sex-changing goddess of Babylon, 
Dona Diva and her friends would 
switch clothing. On the first morn­
ing of carnival, the women mem­
bers of her dirty block would wear 
mens’ jackets inside out, the men 
would dress up as women, and 
then we’d party the whole day long 
(pp. 196-7) . . .  a man in black 
lingerie, garter belt and high heels 
. .. more men in their wives’ cloth­
ing, one with a smear of red lip­
stick across his mouth. Even those 
who aren’t cross-dressed sport a 
sprig of rue sacred to the warrior 
god Ogun” (p. 213).
In rituals and festivals, inver­
sions and distortions of age, sex, or 
status, with the additional element 
of play (burlesque, caricature, and 
parody) help to give definition and 
clarity to that which is considered 
“normal” in a society. By collapsing 
boundaries and confusing or eras­
ing the distinctions between the 
normal and abnormal, right and 
wrong, sacred and secular, the 
boundaries of moral and social 
codes of behavior are made clearer.
Shock and laughter 
free the participants 
from the harsh 
realities of mundane 
life.
By giving license to normally 
shocking displays and violations of 
social norms, festival participants 
and observers are opened up to 
the immediacy of experience
through shock and laughter. The 
society is freed from the harsh reali­
ties of mundane life and the mem­
bers are renewed and transformed 
through the catharsis.
In the final chapters of Samba, 
Guillermoprieto describes the 
shocking freedom and libertinism 
of Carnival and the displays of deca­
dent behavior. Carnival becomes 
an opportunity for “sustained epi­
sodes of intense, unambivalent joy” 
(p. 195): “Black and white, dancers 
and klutzes thrown together into 
the same joyous mess—free, liber­
ated, glamorous and hilarious at 
the same time, returned to the in­
nocence of pure unrestrained exhi­
bitionism, posturing and primping 
and wiggling our hips . .  . yelling at 
the top of our voices and flouncing 
our backsides . . . ” (pp. 189-90).
For the reader as well, Samba, 
despite its weaknesses, provides a 
welcome respite from our encum­
bered, everyday world. ■
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New ad lleteit Unite n latin America
THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA
TomJ. Farer
In this collection of essays, Tom Farer examines critically the stand taken by U.S. foreign policy makers on 
such issues as right- and left-wing dictatorships, revolution, human rights and national autonomy. In this 
fascinating manner, fusing sharp observations at times with polemical intent, Farer scrutinizes the key 
assumptions, including the 'Soviet or revolutionary threat,’  which have guided American foreign policy for Latin 
America since the end of World War II. Farer describes the grand strategy of the United States in Latin America 
(he sees very much the same strategic assumptions guiding U.S. policy throughout the Third World) as 
unrealistic and misguided in terms both of U.S. interests and ideals. His essays combine a sophisticated 
analysis of Latin American society with assessment of U.S. policy from legal, moral and strategic perspectives. 
ISBN: 0-88738-155-3 (cloth) 448 pp. $39.95
THREE LATIN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGISTS
GINO GERMANI, PABLO GONZALES CASANOVA, FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO
Joseph A. Kahl, new Introduction by Peter B. Evans
This is the long overdue second edition of Joseph A. Kahl's masterful Modernization, Exploitation, and 
Dependency in Latin America. In the book, Kahl describes, examines and introduces the life and work of three 
of the most important figures in the development of comparative politics and political sociology: Gino Germani 
(Argentina), Pablo Gonzales Casanova (Mexico) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Brazil). As Peter B. Evans 
points out in his splendid Introduction, the book has not lost its importance and attractiveness in the years that 
have passed. Rather, the subsequent developments in comparative scholarship, as exemplified in the fate of 
modernization and dependency theory, have only highlighted the influence of the three Latin Americans.
ISBN: 0-88738-169-3 (cloth) $24.95
ISBN: 0-88738-700-4 (paper) 240pp. $14.95
POLITICS AND PETROLEUM IN ECUADOR
John D. Martz
In this book, John D. Martz probes the differences and similarities between military authoritarianism and 
democratic pluralism through an analysis of the politics of petroleum in Ecuador. Martz uses a textured and 
detailed analysis of global oil companies and nationalist politics to trace the growth and evolution of Ecuador's 
petroleum industry. Against this interplay of politics and the nationalistic struggle against multinational 
pressures, he compares policymaking under military and civilian government.
ISBN: 0-88738-132-4 (cloth) 432 pp. $34.95
REVOLUTION AND REACTION: BOLIVIA 1964-1985
James M. Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra
This volume focuses on two decades of political life in Bolivia, from the overthrow of civilian president Victor 
Paz Estenssoro in November, 1964 until his return to office in August, 1985. The body of the book provides an 
account of the main contours of political economy in Bolivia from 1964 until 1985. The authors also present an 
interpretative analysis of the problem of regime formation in Bolivia by focusing on the alternations among 
various authoritarian and democratic modes of governance. In a concluding chapter the authors provide an 
analytical framework tying Bolivia into more regional trends concerning the questions of regime formation and 
transition. Bolivia is seen as an extreme case of a common set of problems that have pervaded the region 
during this period.
ISBN: 0-88738-159-6 (cloth) 256 pp. $29.95
E T r a n c a r t i n n  P l l h l i c h p r c  Dept LA 9 Rutgers-The State University, I  r a n S a C l l U n  r u v i i s i i e r s  New Brunswick, NJ 08903
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P U B L I C A T
Music and Dance
by Marian Goslinga
W ith the passing of Dame Margot Fonteyn de Arias in February 1991, the world’s attention was briefly focused on a legend who not only personified classical dance but represented Panama (and indirectly all of Latin America) as ambassador to Great Britain. The music and dance of Latin America were thus propelled to a certain prominence, although these two branches of the fine arts have always been popu­lar exponents of the region’s national consciousness.
While most Latin American countries actively support the concept of a national dance company, 
the BalletFolklorico de Mexico being the most famous, musical reviews are also being published all over the continent. 
Among the more prestigious are the Revista musical chilena, Revista musical de Venezuela, Revista musicalpuertorriquena, 
and, from Mexico, Heterofonia and Pauta.
Unfortunately for the researcher, no recent or definitive bibliography of Latin American music exists. The gather­
ing of relevant information about the region’s music thus requires the perusal of many divergent sources. In answer to 
this need, Malena Kuss’s Latin American Music: An Annotated Bibliography of Reference Sources and Research Materials (New 
York: Garland, forthcoming) is slated to provide 3,000 entries on the topic. A preliminary version of this bibliography, 
with 1,093 entries, was published as Volume IV in the “Work in Progress” series of Music in the Life of Man. A World His­
tory (Paris: International Music Council, UNESCO, 1984) Until Kuss’s bibliography is published, the most comprehen­
sive reference work in the field will remain the 20-volume New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians (Stanley Sadie, 
general editor; Gerard Behague, area editor for Latin America; London: Macmillan, 1980)
Other valuable tools for those seeking information include the series of articles by Malena Kuss and John M. 
Schechter in Latin American Masses and Minorities: Their Images and Realities, volume 2 (Madison, Wis.. SALALM Secre­
tariat, 1987), as well as the monthly guide, The Music Index: The Key To Current Music Periodical Literature (Detroit, Mich.. 
Information Services), which indexes more than 225 periodicals by subject and author In addition, the “Music” sec­
tion contained in the Humanities volume of the Handbook of Latin American Studies (Austin. University of Texas Press), 
currently being compiled by Robert Stevenson, is very useful.
Last but not least, current sources of information can also be found in the Inter-American Music Review and the Latin 
American Music Review, as well as Ethnomusicology’s regular section “Current Bibliography, Discography, and Filmogra­
phy.” General music periodicals such as Billboard and The Village Voice also include sections featuring material specif­
ically on Latin American music.
What follows is a selective list of materials on music and dance in Latin America and the Caribbean published since 
1990.
Accommodation and Resistance in 
Andean Ritual Dance. Deborah A. 
Poole. Drama Review, v. 34 (Sum­
mer 1990), p. 98.
An Analysis and Adaptation of 
Brazilian Folk Music into a String 
Method Comparable to American 
Models for Use in the Brazilian 
Music Education System. Linda 
Louise Kruger Ann Arbor, Mich.. 
University Microfilms Interna­
tional, 1990. 533 p. [Thesis—Uni­
versity of Missouri-Columbia.]
Marian Goslinga is the Latin Ameri­
can and Caribbean librarian at Florida 
International University.
Barbados/Caribbean Jazz Festivals.
Michael Bourne. Down Beat (Octo­
ber 1990), p. 50.
Brazil: A Kaleidoscope of Sound.
Mario de Aratanha. UNESCO Cou­
rier (March 1991), p. 15.
Brazilian Beat Heats Orangina in 
France: Musical Campaign Links 
Drink to Lambada Sound. Peter S. 
Green. Advertising Age (September
11,1990), p. 30.
The Burning Rhythms of Haiti.
Larry Birnbaum. Spin, v. 5 (March 
1990), p. 80.
Canary Islands Bristle with the 
Sounds of the Caribbean. Carlos 
Agudelo. Billboard (March 17, 
1990), p. 84.
Chilean Musicians’ Discourse of 
the 1980’s: A Collective Poetics, 
Pedagogy, and Socio-Aesthetics of 
Art and Popular Music, fuan  Pablo 
Gonzalez. Ann Arbor, Mich.. Univer­
sity Microfilms International, 1990. 
474 p. [Thesis—University of Cali­
fornia, Los Angeles.]
A Comparative Study of the Exist­
ing Inservice Music Programs in 
Puerto Rico with the Beginning 
Teacher Assistance Programs from
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the States of Virginia, Florida and 
Georgia. Gary Abraham Morales.
Ann Arbor, Mich.. University Micro­
films International, 1990. 391 p. 
[Thesis—University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign.]
La danza en el Peru. A. Yori. 
Monsalvat, no. 179 (February 
1990), p. 28-29.
Demystifying South American 
Rhythms. Jorge Morel. Guitar 
Player, v. 24 (May 1990), p. 84+.
Der Tango. Stefan Gies. Musik und 
Bildung, v. 22 (April 1990), p. 213- 
15.
Ethnography of Rumba: Dance and 
Social Change in Contemporary 
Cuba. Yvonne La Verne Payne 
Daniel. Dissertation Abstracts Interna­
tional, v. 50 (April 1990), p. 3275A.
Everywhere We Go, We Are in Dan­
ger: Ti Manno and the Emergence 
of a Haitian Transnational Identity.
N Glick-Schiller, G. Fouron. Ameri­
can Ethnologist, v 17 (May 1990), 
p. 329-47 [Ti Manno is a well- 
known Haitian musician.]
The Evolution of Reggae in Jamai­
ca. Lawrence McLellan,Jr Inter- 
American Music Review, v. 10 (1990), 
p. 51-60.
Exits and Entrances: Current Craze 
on the Brazilian Dance Called 
Lambada. Robert Farris Thomp­
son. Artforum, v. 28 (Summer 
1990), p. 26.
Festival de la Habana 1989. L.
Markowski. Musik und Gesellschaft, 
v. 40 (January 1990), p. 33-34.
Flash Dance of the 90’s. Douglas 
Mercado. Americas, v. 42 (May-June 
1990), p. 3. [About the lambada.]
A Glimpse of Afro-Caribbean 
Music in the Early Seventeenth Cen­
tury. Dominique Rene de Lerma. 
Black Music Research Journal, v. 10 
(1990), p. 94-96.
Gracias a la vida: Das Latein- 
amerika-Festival in Utrecht. Ulrich 
Koch, Ursula Koch. Musik und 
Gesellschaft, v. 40 (May 1990), p. 258- 
61
Grupo Corpo from Brazil Tours 
U.S.A. Antonio Jose Faro. Dance 
Magazine, v. 64 (November 1990), 
p. 14. [About the Brazilian ballet 
company.]
La guitare en Amerique latine: La 
Colombie, le bambuco. Francisco 
Gonzalez. Les Cahiers de la Guitare, 
no. 33 (1990) , p. 14-16.
History, Analysis and Performance 
Practice of the Brazilian Modinha 
from the Eighteenth Century to the 
Present. Maritza Helmen Freda 
Mascarenhas. Ann Arbor, Mich.. 
University Microfilms Interna­
tional, 1990. [Thesis—University of 
Miami.]
It’s Hip, but Is It Happenin’?: Lam­
bada’s Lot like Sex, except More 
Overrated. Charles Leerhsen. News­
week, v. 115 (January 29,1990), 
p. 60.
Jamaica’s Dancehall Style Takes 
Hold. Paul J. Wexler Rolling Stone, 
no. 573 (March 8, 1990), p. 60.
Jazz Goes to Rio, Sao Paulo, Too.
Robin Tolleson./azz Times (January 
1990), p. 10.
LA. Embraces Lambada Craze.
Michael Stremfel. Los Angeles Busi­
ness Journal (March 9, 1990), p. 1
The Lambada Craze. Richard 
Gehr Spin, v. 6 (April 1990), p. 128.
Lambada Hopes to Dance Its Way 
into the U.S. Market. Thom Duffy, 
Chris McGowan. Billboard (January
13,1990), p. 6+.
Lambada Soviet-Style. Steven 
Shabard. World Press Review, v 37 
(July 1990), p. 46.
Latin American Piano Music.
Enrique Alberto Arias. Clavier, 
v. 30, no. 2 (1991), p. 20+.
Leaping across Frontiers. Jan
Hanvik. Americas, v. 42, no. 4 
(1990), p. 56-57 [Discusses Latin 
American modern dance and the 
American Dance Festival.]
Lusting for Lambada. Nicholas Jen­
nings. Maclean’s, v. 103 (February 
5, 1990), p. 52-53.
Mehr als Mariachis: Streifziige 
durch die Musik Mexikos. Monika 
Fiirst-Heidtmann, Gunthild 
Heidtmann. Neue Zeitschriftfur 
Musik, x. 151 (February 1990), 
p. 16.
Mexican Cumba Is a Far Cry from 
Its Caribbean Progenitor. Carlos 
Agudelo. Billboard (May 19, 1990), 
p. 56.
Michel Camilo: Caribbean Jazz 
Classic. Larry Birnbaum. Down 
Beat, v. 57 (March 1990), p. 24-25.
Music of Brazil: An Explosion of 
Creativity from Rio to Bahia.
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Publications Update
Gerald Seligman. Stereo Review, 
v. 55 (August 1990), p. 66-69.
Music: Burning Down the House.
Erik Davis. The Village Voice, v. 35 
(February 13, 1990), p. 74. [Music 
in Haiti.]
Music: Rub-a-dub. Julian Dibbell.
The Village Voice, v. 35 (January 30, 
1990), p. 82-83. [About the lam­
bada.]
Nara Leao, Brazil’s Poetess of Mod­
em Song. Mark Holston. Americas, 
v 42 (January-February 1990), p. 1- 
5.
On the Scene: Argentina, Alive and 
Well. A. Deusebio.Jazz Forum, no. 
122 (1990), p. 5. [Jazz in Argen­
tina.]
Play It or Die. Phil Patton. Esquire, 
v. 115, no. 3 (March 1991), p. 72. 
[About music in Colombia.]
Puerto Rican Piano Music of the 
Nineteenth Century. Alberto Hector 
Hernandez. Ann Arbor, Mich.. Uni­
versity Microfilms International,
1990. 152 p. [Thesis—Columbia 
University Teachers College.]
Research Centers and Sound Ar­
chives of Traditional Music in 
Latin America. E. Morenocha.
Fontes Artis Musicae, v. 37, no. 2 
(1990), p. 179-91.
Roses from the South. Michael 
Ponder The Strad,\, 101 (January 
1990), p. 18-19. [About Argentin­
ean music.]
Salsa Music: Primary Dimensions 
of Meaning in an Expressive Cul­
tural Form—The Puerto Rican Ex­
perience as Chronicled via Salsa 
Lyric Poetics. Barbara Kay Vargas. 
Ann Arbor, Mich.. University Micro­
films International, 1990. [Thesis— 
University of California, Irvine.]
Salsa: Puerto Rican and Latino 
Music. Felix M. Padilla. Journal of 
Popular Culture, v. 24 (Summer 
1990), p. 87
Scambada: Dirty Dancing All the 
Way to the Bank. Richard Gold.
Variety, v. 338 (March 1990), p. 1+. 
[About the lambada dance craze in 
Brazil.]
The Secret of Good Latin Jazz.
Charles Gerard. Jazz Educators Jour­
nal, v. 22 (1990), p. 63-65.
The Sound of Brazil: Follow the 
Music and Let It Guide You to the 
Heart of the Country. John Krich.
The New York Times Magazine, v. 140 
(October 21,1990), p. 28, col. 1.
South of the Border: A Caballo.
John Santos. Modem Drummer, v. 14 
(March 1990), p. 72.
Speaking in Tongues. Craig 
Bromberg. Rolling Stone (January
11,1990), p. 48-49.
Stagium Battles Social Ills. Robert 
Johnson. Dance Magazine, v. 65, 
no. 3 (March 1991), p. 13. [About 
Mark Gidali and Decio Otero, 
founders of Brazil’s Stagium dance 
company.]
Structure, Context, and Strategy in 
Musical Ethnography. Thomas 
Turino. Ethnomusicology, v. 34, no. 3 
(Fall 1990), p. 399-412. [Specifi­
cally refers to the Fiesta de la Cruz 
in Conima, Peru.]
A Theory on the Origin of the 
Organ’s Quintadena. Ralph
Blakeley. The Musical Times, v. 131 
(March 1990), p. 163+. [About the 
history of traditional Peruvian 
organ music.]
Tito Puente: King of the Middle 
World. Fred Bouchard. Down Beat 
(May 1991), p. 20-21
Tow to Tango. Rob Prince. Folk 
Roots, no. 83 (May 1990), p. 31+.
Uptown Dominica (Merengue).
Daisann McLane. Spin, v. 6 (May 
1990), p. 86.
With Guiros and Maracas: Hispanic 
Christian Music in a Charismatic 
Church. Milagros Agostini 
Quesada. The Hymn, v. 41 (1990), 
p. 30-33.
The Women of Merengue. Mark 
Holston. Americas, v. 42 (May-June 
1990), p. 54. [About women musi­
cians in Latin America.]
Worldstyle: Wasting Away in 
Lambadaville. Lee Jeske. Cash Box, 
v. 53 (February 17,1990), p. 9.
New Publication
LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN CENTER
The Changing Hemispheric Trade Environment: 
Opportunities and Obstacles
Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
Prominent scholars and policymakers analyze options for hemispheric trade, including the 
likely impact of a North American free trade agreement and a single European market and 
the roles of Japan and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
165 pp. $11.95 (paperback)
Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, 
University Park, Miami, Florida 33199; (305) 348-2894; Fax (305) 348-3593.
Hemisphere •  Summer 1991

Hemisphere 
Latin American and Caribbean Center 
Florida International University 
University Park 
Miami, Florida 33199
Non Profit Org. 
U.S. Postage 
PAID 
Miami, FL 33199 
Permit No. 3675
